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This paper was prompted by my own somewhat vary-
ing attitudes toward a npval career in the past, and my
challenge to cell a naval career to the junior officers
with whom I work.
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galloped back and forth on it.
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Bigel, and Lieutenant Mel Chapman, Bureau of Naval Per-
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Dezer and Corporal K. V. Roberts, Marine Corps.
One seldom finds a friend, statistician and psy-
chologist rolled into on« individual as I found in Mr.
Richard Fotocko, who has unselfishly devoted twelve
Saturdays assisting me. The sheer magnitude of what was
done in data processing and statistical calculations
would not have been possible without his efforts, not to
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mention the guidance and advice.
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There Is probably no Issue In the history of the
United States that Is as old and still is as badly han-
dled as the issue of pay of the Armed Forces*
The Issues and arguments are older then the coun-
try Itself, the concepts as changing as the sciences of
our times*
It can be safely said that wyou don*t get some-
thing for nothing** When the purchasing power of the
Armed Services personnel does go down there is an in-
creasing amount of "moon lighting*. More time is taken
off to perform services that would ordinarily be pur-
chased* with resulting less service to the government*
One finds an increase of worrying over personal finances
with an attendant loss of efficiency on the Job; also
there is a higher rate of court msrtials which adds an
increasing workload of administrative procedures, brig
time, guards and citizens acquiring criminal records
when they should be serving their country*
Is Congress asking for something for nothing?
From the service side of the picture the answer is an
obvious yes, to this writer* But, perhaps the services
(Navy for the purpose of this thesis) are trying to
maintain a quality of officers above the desires of the

2Congress as well as the American people*
Undoubtedly almost every adult In the United
States could make a long and vigorous defense of the
need for high level intelligence and Industriousness
in military personnel. But, these same people would be
hard put to advance an idea as to why the military should
have comparable pay. Generally the idea of pay would be
shrugged off with, w it f s their patriotic duty."
This thesis is based on the premise that money is
a prime factor for a naval officer in deciding whether
or not he should be a career officer as he reaches the
point of completing his obligated service.
Some authorities maintain that the junior officer,
when he does look at money, thinks only of what he is
getting today and will be getting in the immediate future.
It is believed he does not look at today, thinks little
of the immediate future, other than the basic need levels,
or slightly higher, but makes his decision on income and
living standards of Lieutenant Commanders and senior
officers.
The hypothesis is the cause of the above situation.
This is, Congress complains long and loud on the inabili-
ty of the services to hold the Junior officer and hence
reduce the high cost of training new officers, not to
mention poor administration of manpower and resources

due to the low experience level of the Junior officers.
It takes an officer about eight to ten years to
develop the set of ideals (i.e., patriotism, esprit de
corps, and dedication) that will permanently retain the
career officer. Realizing this or not, Congress does
know he can be bought at bargain basement rates, but not
realizing, as a body at least, that this is what drives
the junior officer out of the service. Thus, the expen-
sive problem of retraining is created. This is far more
costly than the higher pay rates in industry for proper
management.
This paper will be presented in three parts, with
the intent that each part can adequately demonstrate in
its own theme the need for adequate military pay.
Part One will give historical background and
highlight some of the issues and problems of the past.
The deficit of military pay has been paid in prolonged
conflicts and American lives, to which the American pub-
lic has given tacit approval.
Part Two will demonstrate the problem in economics
of today's wage standards.
* U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 2 of the
Committee of Armed Services, Career Incentive Act of 1955 »
84th Cong., 1st Seas., Feb. 7, 1955, p. 558.
1 0. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee ??o. 2 of the
Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on Method of Compu-
ting Basic Fay . 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, p. 5347.

4Part Three will show by statistical analysis
the psychological problem facing Congress, the Navy,
and the officer himself In officer retention*
The figures of pay used throughout are basic pay
and sea pay where applicable* This Is not an attempt
to discount allowances, but to open the door for one
allowance opens the door for all* And for some allow-
ances certain conditions must be fulfilled to qualify
for them* The thought of Congress on allowances is that
it agrees with the provision of dependents, but actually
some allowances do not provide for dependents* Right
here, with the junior officer, is where the problem lies*
Inasmuch as the idea behind this paper is to study Junior
officer retention problems of top quality applicants, it
is left to the reader to apply allowances to the case he
has in mind*
This study is limited to naval officer pay. This
author believes a more critical situation exists here
than In any other area of the military with which he has
a working knowledge* This problem goes much deeper than
the mere personal problems of individual officers* Ideas
will be diseussed as this psper is developed*
In some instances the "facts'* have been extremely
difficult to identify, as different authors have reported
differing dates and figures on what one would think of as
commonplace public information* Then printing errors and

5statements that appear to be e slip of the tongue have
compounded the problem. If errors are noted in the
citing of "facts" or documents in this paper it is hoped
the reader will forgive with a kindly smile and look only
to its theme.
The personal interest of this author on pay and
retention arises from the basic fact he is a member of the
United States Navy and is sharpened by some of the facets
of his career*
While serving as an Fnsign, this writer in 1949
met his wife who was employed by the Navy Department in
Civil Service at a CAF 3 rating which is equal to the
military pay grade F 2, Her annual salary, prior to the
Classification Act of 1949, with its subsequent pay raise
In October of that year, w.a H«W.M in atep t.« An
Ensign's annual pay was $2160.
Due to a belief that a decent married life was not
possible on an Ensign's pay, a resignation was submitted
end civilian life was resumed in July 1949. In October
1949, the Department of State offered the writer a posi-
tion as a code clerk, with starting salary of $2800 per
*U. S., Department of Defense, Table of Military-
Civilian Relationships for Prisoner of V ar Identification
Purposes, Defense Directive 1000.1, June 29, 1956.
o
u*. S., Civil Service Commission, Chart CSC 490 ,
October 1962.
U. 3., Department of Defense, Career Compensation
for the Uniformed Forces by Advisory Commission on Service
Pay , (Hook Report). December 1948. p. 16.

6annum. This was equivalent to a Lieutenant* s pay, with
six years longevity.*
With a recall to active duty in May 1951, as a
Lieutenant Junior grade, this writer married and during
a two year tour had a second dependent. In May of 1953,
when a departure was again made from active duty, pay vs
expenses was the major consideration. An aside here,
during this two year period, which was served on board
the TJSS McGowan (DD 678), the time was spent at the follow-
ing locations: San Diego 1 month; Long Beach 1 month;
San Diego, 1 month; San Francisco, 2 months; at sea, 1
month; Kewport, R. I., 2 months; Boston, 3 months; Newport,
1 month, Guantanamo, Cuba, 2 months; Newport, 1 month;
world cruise, 7 months; Newport, 1 month.
Not many Lieutenants Junior grade receiving a total
of from £459 for three years service to #476 for six years
service, (total pay and allowances) were staying in the
service on this kind of schedule.
With the pay raise in 1955, the salary was con-
sidered liveable for a Lieutenant with three dependents.
A return to the Navy for a career was made for a reason
which is entirely foreign to many civilians and their
conception of service life. In the U. S. Navy there are
positions of responsibility for the officer to shoulder
if he is man enough to do so. There is also a great deal
1 Ibid,

7more personal and mental freedom than Is offered by-
private corporations. However, Individual interests in
pay of the armed forces is more than a personal thing.
On this hinges the quality and quantity of the junior
officer input.
Even if there is time to mobilize a military
force for a third world war, the regular establishment
of today will be the herd core of tomorrow.
The figures used in pay scales which follow are
those for a single officer on sea duty. It can be argued
that allowances should be included, but even for the sin-
gle man the subsistence allowance does not cover the add-
ed expense of sea duty.
To use the allowances for married men prescribes
thst rti officer be married, and to quote the old saw,
"They didn't issue you a wife with your sea bag."
The primary purpose is to present this paper,
within its limited scope, on the young and highly intelli-
gent officer* s considerations, when he makes his decision
to slip the lines and sail with the careerists; or secure,
and as often as not, regretfully go "home."
With the thousands of pay situations in the TIevy
this presentation should provide the reader with the
besic tools to complete the picture he visualizes.

PART I




Prom the conception of the United States of
America pay of the armed forces has been a sore and try-
ing problem for the leaders of this country and the mili-
tary and naval commanders. George Washington wrote in
1778 about the loss of purchasing power of the Army pay.
Our money is now sinking fifty per cent
a day, •..while a great part of the officers
of our army from absolute necessity are
quitting the service, and the more virtuous
few, rather than do this are sinking by
sure degrees into beggarly and want.*
This statement by Washington probably sets the
tone of the times, that every commission on pay studies
and congressional hearing which preceded pay legislation,
has had since the founding of the Army and Navy of the
United States.
There is no attempt here to discuss military pay
in total. Congress from the beginning has recognized
service upon the sea as different from services by the
lend forces. Navy pay from 1826 until modern times pro-
vided a differential for sea duty. This has been due to
the realization that the expenses are greater for an
* Thomas T. Tulipsne, The Sociological Organization ,
Motivations, and Value Systems of the Armed Forces , (unpub-
lished Master's thesis, Naval Financial Management Program,
George Washington University, 1958), p. 7 quoting John C.
Fitzpetrick (ed.) The Writings of George Washington,





officer (or enlisted man) while serving away from his
dependents.
A brief summary of pay schedules for the Navy
from 1794 to 1826 is presented in Table 1 on the follow-
ing page.
The unresolved problem of military pay highlights
many of the saddest and most devastating points of Ameri-
can history* Little have the opponents of military pay
realized the heartbreak they would reap for themselves,
their families, friends, and common ancestors.
The watch word of today was said by Washington,
MTo be prepared for war is one of the most effective
means for preserving peace »**
Lessons on military pay and preparedness which
were so laboriously learned during the Revolution were
forgotten long before the war of 1812, and unnecessary
money, manpower, and resources had to be wasted to win
a conflict which either shouldntt have taken place or
should not have lasted so long.
In 1826, pay for ftaval officers at sea was raised
an average of twenty-five per cent over the 1798 pay
rates. During these times prize money was a big incen-
tive for remaining in the service between wars. Tn the
1830 f s hopes of prize money were fading for United States
^ Supra . 1, Tulipane, p. 15.
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Value of rations not known for 1794.
*lValue of rations - f.20 per day.




Kaval officers and a new pay scale became necessary.
In 1835, pay was tripled though the cost of living
had remained fairly constant since 1326.
The next pay increase came in 1860, with an
increase of about ten per cent in pay and longevity
(or time in service) made its first appearance In
the pay scales. But it was not long lived; in 18G2,
a new bill was passed and all ranks received a pay
eut except Lieutenant junior grade. The cut was on
a sliding scale with a thousand dollars being taken
from Commanders and twenty-five dollars from Lieuten-
ants. This bill however, created three new ranks:
Rear Admiral, Lieutenant Commander, and Fnsign.
During the Civil War, the civilian wage scale
and the cost of living index went up one hundred and
2
seventy-seven per cent. To help meet this situation
Congress again authorized prize money and bounty pay-
ments.
The Civil War experience is a good example of
the lack of preparedness which is evidenced by effec-
tive armed forces. Effective troops could probably
have won the battle of Bull Run. The loss of life
and devastation during the Civil iacp cost this coun-
try untold amounts when measured in progress.
•M?. S.j department of Labor, Bureau of Labor




Annual Pay which a Naval Officer on Sea Duty-
would have received under each of the Several Pay













LIEUTENANT 1,800 1 , 900
(10 yr's. service)


























1908 1920 1922 1942
10,000 10,000 8,000 8,800









5,500 6,100 5,600 6,160
4,960 5,550 4,560 5,050
4,290 5,130 3,950 4,125
3,168 3,388 2,760 3,036
2,420 3,020 2,200 2,310







































No. of times a Lt.j.g. could
expect his pay to multiply if
and when he makes Captain 3.5 2.33
Purchasing Power of Lt. J.g.'s
salary
Purchasing Power of Capt.'a salary
Cost of Living Index 57-59= 100
1. The grade of "Admiral" ceased to exist
with the death of Admiral David Porter in 1891.
2. For "Admiral of the Navy" which ceased to exist
with the death of Admiral Dewey in 1917.
3. Ensign's pay was not used inasmuch as there has
been no pay increase in the lest ten years.
2.25
2.72 2.38 2.1 2.5 2.67 2*22 2 ,IQ 2.41 2.32 2.66
5,700 7,125 4,340 3,750 4,060 5,550 4
,
01 3,750 4,325 4,440




The pay increase of 1870 increased pay over the
level of the 1360 f s, and while prices had retreated
from Civil War highs, thil raise did not cover the cost
of Living increase for the ten yesr period.
In 1B76, two new introductions were made in
service remuneration: 1. An eight cent per mile travel
allowance which was to stand until 1949, when it was
decreased, A period over which the consumer price in-
dex more then doubled.
The other new innovation was a retirement pay of
seventy-five per cent of see pay after forty-five years
service. Previous to this, retirements had boen only
for those who were disabled or incapacitated, A stag-
nation of promotions had existed after the War of 1812
and was again present after the Civil War, when officers
became Lieutenants at the age of nineteen end fifteen
years later were still Lieutenants,
The Spanish American War is another "good"
example of stagnated military preparedness.
In 1S99, the Navy and Army were put on the same
pay scale. Naval officers on sea duty received the
same pay as Army officers, but when assigned ashore,
they received a deorease of fifteen per cent. Commuta-
tion and quarters allowances were provided for those
1 Fletcher Pratt, The Compact History of the




assigned to shore duty.
The Pay Act of 13 May 1908, was to cover the
Increase In cost of living that had occured since 1899.
The Act of 1908, provides much of the foundetion of today*
s
pay legislation. This act provided for a ten per cent
pay increase for sea duty or foreign shore duty as opposed
to the old method of less pay for shore duty. All this
was prompted by the usual post war problem of letting
military pay go unattended, and promotions stagnate,
with the resulting exodus of an alarmingly high percen-
tage of the better qualified young officers.
The 1908 pay raise is the last effective pay in-
crease for the military in terms of purchasing power and
standard of living. (See Table 2, page 13.)
In 1920, a temporary pay raise was passed to
cover the increased cost of living which had doubled
from the days of 1903. This pay increase was to expire
in 1929. During the pey hearings preceding the Act of
June 19, 1922, General Pershing, United States Army,
made the following statement:
As I stated before this committee before,
I had more money as a second lieutenant
than I have today, as a general. •• .Officers
with families were able to get along and
educate their children on the pay in those
days without being put to i very great
financial strain. In theue d«y3 It is a
very difficult thing for officers who have
families to meet the expenses .^
U. S»i Congress, House, Special Committee on
Readjustment of Service Pay, 1921 , p. 103.

After General Pershing, Captain Phillip Williams,
United states Navy, appeared before the committee and
presented a statement pert of which Is as appropriate
today (is then:
val administration and strategy require
very frequent changes in the locetion of
ships and personnel. This results in the
personnel and their families constantly
living in a transient state, and hence
paying transient prices for all necessa-
ries of life. It causes frequent hard-
ship and expense, due to such matters as
duplicating taxes, having to pay rent on
unexpired leases after houses are vacated,
inability to reduce rent by purchasing
houses, special travel on account of family
sickness end death, loss of and damage to
household equipment incident to frequent
handling, storage of household goods, etc.
A hundred drains swell the expense of liv-
ing a transient life.
••••in addition other unusual expenses
not common to civil life, such as high-
er insurance rates, the frequent need for
maintaining an official position etc.
Under many circumstances, especially
abroad, the latter is a considerable bur-
den which cannot be avoided except by
lowering the prestige of the United States.
••••Civilians everywhere demanded and re-
ceived large increases of salary,*
Commander Lewis H. Forterfield, United States
Navy, testified and one comment is particularly note-
worthy for 19E1 or 1963,
Two years ago complaints were coming in by
the hundreds from ships and stations that
materiel was rapidly deteriorating, due to
the lack of experienced men for upkeep and
repairs, 2





The Pay Act of 192? was passed during a period
of lower prices when compared with 19P0, and pay was
cut and sap pay was withdrawn. This reduced pay be-
low the 1908 level. However, prices hadn't fallen
relatively. In fact the lowest price level of 192?
was 180 per cent of the 1908 price level. In 1923
the consumer price index started up and continued to
climb until 1988.
Pay was temporarily cut during the depression
and promotions came without pay. But, the military
man's purchasing power was up, even with the pay cufc,
and he had dependability of income. ?»ith the excep-
tions of 1908, he was ahead of the game when comp?3red
to his civilian contemporaries for the first time in
one hundred years. However, he had still lost ground
when compared to his predecessors.
In 1942, pay was raised only slightly, and ten




POST WORLD WAR II
The Act of 29 June 1946, gave Tnaigna and
Lieutenants Junior grade a twenty par cent increase;
Lieutenants a fifteen per cent increase. Other pay
grades were increased ten per cent. The cost of living
from 1942 to 1946 had increased twenty per cent. This
was the first pay increase for Lieutenants through
Captains since 1922 and for flag rank officers since
1908.
In 1948, The Advisory Commission on Service Pay
was formed with Mr. Charles R. Hook as chairman to study
the pay situation.
The Hook Commission had several comments on basic
pay including the following:
A percentage increase based on the present
scales would not correct existing inequities,
nor would a cost-of-living adjustment be a
proper solution.
... .Responsibility increases along with grade,
and the able man must be encouraged to seek
this responsibility. Special pays now in
existence, treated later in this report, pro-
duce added inequities and would further in-
crease injustice, should a revision be made
on a percentage basis.
A cost-of-living increase in pay would,
of necessity, be a percentage increase and
a false solution to the problem because of
the present unbalance of the pay structure.
During the past 40 years there have been
three major changes in the military pay scales
for officers and four changes affecting en-
listed personnel. Altogether, during this
period, about a dozen revisions were enacted,
including percentage decreases during the




the scale developed in 1908 were retained
throughout, despite an attempt in 1922 to
arrive at logical differences between ?s
and to correlate military with civilian pay
for comparable responsibility. -s of the
end of World War II, therefore, the scale
approved In 1946 continued many of the fun-
damental inequities. Tn addition, percentage
increases over 1942 averaged about IP per-
cent for officers, 15 to 20 per cent for the
higher grades of enlisted personnel, and 50
per cent for the entry enlisted grade, further
exaggerating the trend favoring enlisted per-
sonnel.
To be workable, a pay scale must have
starting rates in each grade high enough
to attract desirable personnel.
....Increases for length of service should
provide a stimulus to do better work but
should cease after a reasonable period of
time so that a lower level of responsibility
will not receive the pey of a higher level
and thus remove the incentive of striving
for promotion.
••••Pay differentials between grades should
be greater than in-grade increases.
••••Increased leadership responsibility
should have corresponding rewards.
When an emergency arises, the safety and
welfare of the United States depend on effi-
cient performance of the Uniformed Forces.
It La the one institution *n our country that
can never be allowed to fail. 1'he effective-
ness of any organization can be no greater,
over an extended period, then the efficiency
of its management. £ny pay program that re-
wards longevity equally with promotion, or
in which longevity awards are sufficient in
the career serviceman, without the necessity
of assuming added responsibility, wo\ild have
a deadening effect upon many and could scerce-
ly fell to develop a less efficient fighting
force. Promotion must be rewarded more than
mere length of service.
The pay scale should be constructed on
the career expectancy of Gervice personnel.
U. S., Department of Pefense, A "Report end
v
e;commendation for the Secretary of Defense by the Advisory
Commission on Service Pay, ( 1vsshinsrton, D.C.: 5* G. Oov-
ernment Printing Office, 1948) pp. 1-2.
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In the hearings which followed the Hook Commission,
Mr. Whiting, a member of the commission testified in parts
••••In 1946 the present scales were adopted.
In the face of rapidly rising prices it was
deemed necessary to obtain relief from those
most sorely pressed* Percentage increases
varying from 50 percent for the lowest grade,
that is the seventh grade enlisted man—to
10 percent for the highest grade were enacted,
••••strong desire in 1946 of having a 20 per-
cent increase for all men in the services, but
there was a comprised arrived at ••••
....The result of all these different acts
taken together was to unbalance the pay
structure, unduly weight longevity, and fail
to reward adequately top management.^
In discussing the Navy, the remark is often made
that there are more Admirals and Captains today and that
more men make it. However, Admiral Fechteler, testified
before the aforementioned hearing as follows:
....In 1910, 2 percent of the officers of
the Navy were of flag rank. Today six-
tenths of 1 percent are officers of flag
rank. The comparable figures for Captain
in 1910 was 7 percent, today it is 6.3 per-
cent.*
While the Hook Commission recommended withdrawal
of sea pay for officers, Admiral Fechteler testified as
follows:
••••we recommend 10 percent for officers
and enlisted men* Our reasons for that were
that Americans as a general *»ule prefer to
remain inside the United States* •••Industry
TJ« S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Armed Services, Career Compensation for the Uniformed
Forces , 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 1421.
2 Ibid., p. 1463.
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pays more for people to go outside of the
United States for comparable Jobs,
Insofar as Officers are concerned, we
have this continual struggle, you might
call it, between special duties which don't
entail going to sea and the seagoing end of
the Navy, and we felt there should be a dis-
tinction in the matter of pay. 1
The budget soon came into the discussion on sea
pay for officers and the final bill killed officer sea pay.
Although the fact that officers on sea duty have a higher
cost of living in addition of the mere fact of separation
9from dependents.
The pay bill enacted in 1949 was not sufficient to
curb officer resignations; the cost of living standard
for Lieutenant junior grade was the lowest of the last
two decades, and a Captain wasn't much better off then he
had been during the inflationary period of 1920. This was
even in the year the bill was enacted.
The cost of living was to rise eleven per cent
from 1949 to 1952 when the next pey bill was to be enacted;
this bill did nothing to stop the decline of the service-
man's purchasing power.
In 1953, the Commission on Incentive-Hazardous
Duty and Special Pays, also known as the Strauss Commission,
presented among other things the following in its report:
That it is the duty of able-bodied American
citizens to serve in the Armed Forces of
the TJ. S. in time of war or national emergency.





That while in the early days of the
republic technical skills played a minor
part in the Armed Forces, technological
changes in methods of warfare have made
it imperative to train men in advance in
time of peace, to attain proficiency in
the military arts. It has, therefore,
become necessary for the Armed Forces to
compete with peacetime civilian attrac-
tions to retain such men.
That incident to the methods of
modern warfare, some duties involve greet
hazards and discomforts and require a
high degree of skill. Many others although
requiring skills, are relatively safe and
comfortable. Additional pay is necessary
to man the hazardous and disagreeable assign-
ments on a voluntary basis.
That, under present conditions involving
partial war and partial mobilization over a
period of indefinite duration, the problem
of maintaining high morale in a armed force
of three to four million men is without guiding
precedent, and also without precedence is the
maintenance of a large combat ready force out-
side of the United States. A fair pay schedule,
soundly administered, Is a major factor in the
maintenance of morale. 1
In the course of Its study the Commission interviewed
hundreds of officers and men. One of the most frequent
complaints heard was that the government seemed to feel no
obligation to carry out the terms of employment under
which servicemen had been recruited. Officers pointed
out that retirement benefits were often a determining fac-
tor in their decisions to undertake military careers, and
that the rules governing retirement were modified unfav-
2
•rably midway in their career.
1 U.S., Department of Defense, Commission on Incen-
tive-Hazardous Duty and Special Pays, Differential Pays
for the Military * (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-





The Strauss Commission also made several general
recommendations to the Congress* Among which it said
Congress should use great care in changing the terms of
employment for the armed services. And when it must be
done to make it applicable to only those recruited after
the change
•
In 1955, the Congress again tackled the problem
of military pay since the pay increases during the pre-
vious ten years had been negated by the rising cost of
living.
The problem of incentives for Junior officers
had trailed every major war the United States had engaged
In, Advancing technology had always compounded the prob-
lem, but in the 1950*8 it assumed catastrophic proportions.
A new problem had been in existence since the end
of World War II. The heavy deployment schedules brought
long separations from dependents. As experienced offi-
cers resigned, those remaining had to be assigned an in-
creasing number of extended deployments thus compounding
the problems of morale and officer retention.
These problems are highlighted by the statements
made before the Subcommittee of the Armed Services Commit-
tee House of Representatives. From Secretary of Defense
Wilson they heard:
Too many of our yoi rig officers and men,
after receiving their technical training,
1 Ibid., p. 50.
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are leaving the service at the first op-
portunity. As a result we face a continu-
ing shortage of personnel in the 4 to 10
years' service bracket and the readiness
of our combat units will be difficult to
improve if we are unable to Induce more
men to stay with us longer* Today more
than at any other time in our peace time
history we must have men who are willing
to serve anywhere in the world, undergo-
ing hardships, inconveniences and the dis-
ruption of a normal family life. This
deployment of our armed services abroad
to so msny sreas of the world is also
placing an increased responsibility upon
our military personnel.
It would be difficult for any business
to survive on the same basis with such a
high loss of experienced personnel. I know
of no easy solution to our manpower problems.
....It is not enough, however, to raise
the pay of a youngster for the immediate
future. There must be a goal to which
the young man can esplre. This goal must
include, in addition to the intangible re-
wards which any American gets for patriotic
service, an ultimate material reward com-
mensurated with the responsibilities with
which he is entrusted. If the peak of the
career is not attractive to the type of young
men we need for future leaders in this multi-
billion dollar defense business, true leaders
will not seek a military career. For this
reason, it is essential that we recognize the
requirements for adjusting the pay of our
senior officers as well as for the juniors. 1
A memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense dated February 20, 1953, had stated
in part:
In short, the current situation Invites
and encourages mediocrity in the direction
and management of our Armed Forces, which
U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 2 of the
Committee of Armed Services, Career Incentive Act of 1955 ,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 7, 1955, p. 396.
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the Nation can 111 afford. Analyzed In the
light of the fact that the larger function
of our great national budget Is now adminis-
tered by uniformed officers, in whose hands
actually repose the key responsibilities for
calculating vast material requirements and
for supervising the expenditure of great sums
of money, the KB felt that the Nation cannot
afford to be content with anything short of
the highest caliber personnel for our Armed
Forces* To discourage the development of a
high-quality corps of officers, warrant offi-
cers, and noncommissioned officers by diminish-
ing the attractiveness of such service must
ultimately prove to be shortsighted economy
with unfavorable reflections not only upon the
quality of our defense but upon the husbanding
or our national treasxire as well.-*-
Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, had this to sayt
In brief, the problem we are facing in the
Department of Defense is our Inability to
retain in the services on a voluntary career
basis the top-notch junior officers and petty
officers that we must have for the future
security of this Nation. We do not have et
this time any shortage of qualified officers
in the higher grades. However, to Insure that
same condition a generation from now is the
problem**'
Prom the Secretary of the Navy Thomas the committee
heard:
....the bill proposes a modest, but I think
overdue increase in the basic pay of the flag
and general officers In our senior command
levels. In terms of compensation for their
heavy responsibilities this pay proposal, in
my opinion, still does not adequately compen-
sate these senior officers, The senior offi-
cers in the flag and general grades should be
1 Ibid., p. 398.
2 Ibid., p. 402.
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compensated more nearly in accordance
v/ith civilian executive level salaries.1
Admiral Carney, "J. S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations,
partly in a prepared statement and partly in response to
questions from Congressman Gavin said:
•••There are certain corrective measures
and improvements which we can undertake
without your support and we are working
diligently to achieve conditions which will
make military life for our uniformed people
and their families more nearly comparable to
conditions on the outside.
However, the thinking of our people is
profoundly affected by other factors over
v/hich we have no control, and this matter of
pay is one of them.
As a matter of fact, our best information
indicates that pay has now become the most
important single factor. ¥»e are not unaware
of the satisfactions of serving, and we do
our beet to Inculcate the sense of pride and
self-respect which will engender devotion to
this military life, but those arguments lose
much of their effect if a man feels that his
worth is not recognized, and when he is con-
fronted with the stark realities of providing
a decent living and decent advantages for his
family.
Admiral Carney : I know, Mr. Gavin, I came back
here after the war as a rear admiral in the
lower half, and my pay could buy less in the
way of living standards in Washington than I
was able to enjoy when I was a lieutenant com-
mander with two young and expensive—two grow-
ing children to take care of.
Mr. 3-avin : You think the scale that is set up
here—for the lieutenant Junior grade, lieu-
tenant, and lieutenant commander, ere adequate
and attractive enough to have these young men
remain in the service?
;
A dmlral Carney : I am not too concerned about
tne lower grades, sir. As I said, my preoccu-
pation is really with the senior grades in
the enlisted and then it runs through the




But as was pointed out by a previous
witness, if the young officer sees a goal
up ahead that is worthwhile. He knows he
is not coming up against the stops, half-
way up the latter, as we have many ties
experienced in the past years, where added
responsibility piles on and sometimes add-
ed expense with that responsibility, with-
out adequate increase in compensation.
And I believe it will, sir, have an im-
portant effect in showing the younger offi-
cers that there is something to shoot at
when they get to the top. 1
In an exchange between Assistant Secretary of the
Army Milton and Congressman Bates, there is an example
of poor homework or poor advisors. The mileage allowance
had been eight cents per mile since 1876, until it was
cut to six in 1949, for permanent change of station. The
five cents allowance was for temporary additional duty
travel*
Kr. Er.te3: But the officer still gets eight
cents s mile?
Sec. Milton: No, six cents.
Mr. Bates: has it always been six, or was it
eight?
;'ec. Milton: Ko, it was five at one time. It
is more recently six. I do not
know when it was change. 5*
The result: the committee and anyone who reads the
printed record believes the military has had an Increase,
where in effect, it has been cut.
General C. L. Bolte, Vice Chief of Staff, United
States Army, left the following thought with the committee
1 i£i£«' P* 421 «
2 IMd «, p. 454.
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This loss of career personnel Is not a
new problem in the Armed r'oreess. . • ...nen-
e-ser the disparity between the tangible
benefits of civilian and military careers
becomes ec great thf.t nen of ability cannot,
in justice to themselves and their families,
afford to don the uniform for their lifetime. 1
The committee also heard about young officers who
commented of the life of their seniors. One, In particu-
lar, when he and his wife viewed the living conditions
of his Captain, decided being a bank teller was better;
o
at least he could aspire to a well paying job.
Captain Martineau, U. 5. Navy, assigned to the
Bureau of Personnel, remarked:
This monetary reimbursement in most cases
hardly even pays for the actual travel costs.
Tn no case does it even begin to reim-
burse a family for such typical expense items
as lease forfeiture, temporary living costs
in hotels, motels, boarding houses, pending
reestablishment of a normal household, break-
age and depreciation of household goods in
transit. It has been a rough rule of thumb
in the services for quite some long time that
three moves are the equivalent of one fire. 3
(In reference to Flag officers)
It Is much more important than just the
matter of increasing the money of the offi-
cers who are holding that rank now. And I
say that with deepest sincerity, because as
isntioned to the committee before, I hav«
attempted to find out what is the feeling of
the younger officers in our today that is
<-king them leave in greater numbers than
they have ever left before.
1
I£I£" P* 4?7 «
2 rbld., p. 559.
5
££!£•» p« 682 «
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In many cases, and I could bring the
letters before this committee, on© of the
principal reasons advanced for these young
men leaving the service is that the incen-
tive along the line at the top is no longer
large enough in their eyes*
, ...And 1 feel I would be negligent in ray
duty and ray obligations to this committee
if I didn't say this: that if this pay bill
in its present form is enacted end no more
is done for the flag and general officers
then is being proposed et the moment, con-
trasting thfct with the pay laws that have
already been enacted for other positions in
the Government, and that going to be enacted
no doubt by this congress, that it will have
in that respect a more detrimental effect.
than if we had passed no pay bill at all.
From the American Legion came a statement that
echos the remarks of all veteran organizational
••• •Whereas military leadership has been
diluted by losses of experienced personnel
has hampered the attractiveness of service
careers; and Whereas take-home pay for
military personnel has not kept psce with
the cost of living, while industry in gen-
eral is increasing the benefits of its e^o-
plojees; and »••«
Whereas the emasculation of traditional
compensatory benefits for military personnel
has hampered the attractiveness of service
careers; and ••••
Whereas the whittling away of these bene-
fits and the reluctance to raise pay scales
are false economy which ignores the fact
that combat effectiveness depends on capa-
ble personnel as well as superior material;
px\d • • • •
whereas the need to improved service bene-
fits and the need to improve the physical
living conditions of military personnel
and their families is flsiftly evident to
the defense Department and to the Congress;
8
• • •
1 Ibid ,, n. 699.
2 XMd ,, p. 699.
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The pay raise of 1955, held the line on coat of
living Increases and even stsrted to reverse the trend
of the last fifty years. 'Veil it should, for no group
of officers in the previous h T story of the IJavy had
worked an herd as the nnval officers of the 1950* s.
In 1956, the Defense Advisory Committee on Pro-
fessional and Technical Compensation (known to most
people as the Cordlner committee) was formed.
Following the report of this committee military
pay hearings were held. In addition to the same theme
as was heard from the Strauss Commission in 1953, and
Hook Commission in 1949, some additional notes were added.
Prom /-dmiral Burke, V, S. Navyx
....Our officers, the bluejacket Btudents,
have to know a tremendously greater amount
than I did when I was a young officer.
They have to bo technically proficient.
It takes time to learn that and you have to
train a large number of people. .. .We have
enough officers now to man the fleets, but
we do not have enough total officers to per-
mit sending enough of our younger officers .
to civilian schools for postgraduate training.
When asked about the pay bill that provided in-
creases for the senior officers and practically no in-
crease for the junior officers he made the following
reply:
... .There again it is a question of balance.
I think it is correct the way it is, but
also I think a lot of the younger officers
U.S., Senate, Subcommittee of the /rmed Services,




are pretty well strapped. They are 1n a
bad way. But if they could look forward to
a time when they can have enough to live on,
it is better than if they get the money now
and th«n look ahead to a time where they
have H°t to be in poverty in the future,
> again it is a question of balance. The
increases have usually occured in the lower
ranks, until now I think it is unbalanced.
The lad looks at his boss and says, "What
is the use? Even if I stay in the Navy 10
or 15 viol's, look what you are fretting", boss.
That is no incentive to me,"
... ..Senator Stennis replied, "Of course the
bill carries now a 6 per cent increase all
the way across the board. **
But during the time since the last pay raise the
cost of living had gone or seven per cent.
The Pay Bill in 1958 started to raise the purchas-
ing power of the officers and at the same time to reverse
the compression of pay between grades. What will happen









Through the years the military has had the problem
of competing with private Industry for top quality young
officers to remain in the service.
This problem has become particularly aggravated by
the recent surge in industrial demands for college gradu-
ates* The table below made by the Placement Director of
Northwestern University of £18 firms shows the average
monthly salaries offered 1963 college graduates with ba-
chelor degrees*
TABLE 3
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These companies will hire about 14$ more bachelor
degree graduates than last year and about 29$ more masters
degree graduates. The largest job increases will be in
engineering.




lor degrees will be receiving the following monthly
"salaries", (comprising basic pay, quarters, and sub-
sistence allowance, plus federal Income tax exemptions
for these allowances ) this summer, 1963:
0-1, Fnsign, without dependents,
Just graduated: $270, that is, 48# of
the above engineer-
ing starting salary.
0-3, Lieutenant, with dependents,




0-4, Lieutenant Commander, with
dependents, grad* 10 yrs.




NOTE: Some of the five and ten-year officers have masters*
degrees.
When one reads of s starting salary of #8400 for
a twenty-one year old college graduate it is particularly
disquieting to think of service pay. While undoubtedly,
this type of offer is for only a few outstanding individuals,
it sets a frame of mind for the young officer. If one
looks at recent trends this is only a prelude to what the
average starting salary will be five years from now.
The tables presented below allow a comparison
with different levels of position, experience, and general
United States economic standards.





Civil Service Pay Adjustments
1968 through January 1964, for four grades,
Step 4 In each grade except GS-18.
Grade 1958 January 1964
Increases
over 1958
GS-18 |17,500 #20,000 14.3#
OS-15 13,670 17,210 25.9^'
GS-7 5,430 6,380 17. 5#
OS-? 3,780 4,195 11. 0#
NOTF.s The ease led inert ases for January 1964 may be
further adjusted upward "by the present Congress,
in order to better spproximate comparability
with private enterprise with the rising national
standard of living and earnings.
TABLE 5
Federal Tege Board Median







4,888 increase over 1955 — 20.5$
5,366 increase over 1958 — 9.8$
increase over 1955 — 32.3$
NOTK: Data not yet available for 1962.
(The above figures are from statistics cited in the
various publications in the bibliography and other author i«





Median Earnings of all
U. S. Males Employed Full Time





1958 $4,893 ma .-
1959 5,175 s.a% 5.8#




NOTFf Fstimated increase 1958 through 1963—24$.
TABLF 7
Policemen and Firemen, 1962,





New York City; #5600
Automatic yearly increases and guaranteed minimum
overtime in New York City brings the unpromoted policeman/
fireman pay, after three yeers service up to $6981. In
late 1962 negotiations were in progress to boost these
rates.
(The above figures are from statistics cited in the
various publications in the bibliography and other authori-

















2 Fnsign 456 537 644
5 fnslgn 484 570 684
4 Ensign 514 604 725
5 Fnsign 545 641 769
6 Lt, J.g, 578 680 816
7 Lt,J.g, 613 721 365
6 Lieut, 650 765 913
9 Lieut. 689 810 973




12 Lcdr, 822 967 1160
13 Lcdr, 872 1025 1230
14 Lcdr. 924 1037 1304
15 Lcdr, 980 1153 1384
16 Cdr. 1039 1222 1467
17 Cdr. 1101 1296 1555
18 Cdr, 1168 1374 1649
19 Cdr, 1239 1457 1749
20 Cdr. 1313 1545 1854
21 Capt, 1393 1639 1967
22 Capt. 1477 1738 2085
23 Capt, 1566 1343 2P11
24 Capt, 1661 1954 2345
25 Capt, 1761 2072 2486
NOTES: 1, Navy rank comparisons made from similar
training, responsibility, and supervision
requirements,
2, Division heads and corporate officers do
not appear in this table.
James E, Kneale, Lcdr, USN, W A Comparison of the
Compensation Provided an Officer of the United States Navy
with that Provided Management Employees in Indus try ,"
(unpublished master's thesis, Navy Management School,




1. military peys cited below are annual basic pay
plus quarters/subsistence allowances and Federal income
tax exemptions therefor. The civilian pays are annuel
salary/wages (straight time pay); additional premium
pay (overtime, night, holiday) are indicated in some
cases. Along with each military pay grade cited, approx-
imate median civilian pays of the corresponding "link-
age" zone is indicated. Flag Officer and G3 grades above
15 are not cited because of compression at the top"
which precludes meaningful comparison with each other
and with private enterprise. The military pays ere
those effective now; the Federal civilian pays are those
to be effective in January 1964, unless increased by the
present Congress.
2. Captain/Colonel grade .
a. Captain/Colonel, 0-6, over 20
years service
b. Civil Service, GS-16, step 4
c. Foreign Service, PSO-2, step 4
d. Postal Field Service FFS-17,
step 4
e. Veterans Admin., Dept. of
Medicine and 3urgery, Director
of Nursing Service
f. National Average (BLS 1961),
private enterprise, for attor-
neys, chemists, and engineers


















(The above figures are from statistics cited in the
various publications in the bibliography and other authori-




h. Merchant Marine. U. S. registered .
(1) Tankers, Atlantic and Gulf Coast,
1958-61 over 25,000 tons, Master
(2) 35,000 Ton, twin screw, Master
(3) Great Lakes ore ships, minimum
annual salary for 8 months/year
service
(4) Ball SS Line, Fast Coast and
Caribbean, Liberty ships, Master
|16,488 plus
qtrs. and subsis-







3. Lieutenant/Captain grade *
e. Lieutenant/Captain, 0-3, over 8
yrs. service
b. Civil Service, GS-11, step 4
c. Foreign Service, FSO-5, step 4
d. Postal Field Service, PFS-11, step 4
e. Veterans Admin,, Dept of Medicine
end Surgery, Assoc. Physician
f. National Average (BLS 1961), private
enterprise for auditors, attorneys,
engineers, and office managers corre-
sponding with Civil Service GS-11
g. MSTS, Civil Service crews, June 1962,











h. Merchant Marine, US registry. Tankers,
over 25,000 tons, 1958-61, 2nd officer 8,496 plus
qtrs. &
subsistence*
(The above figures are from statistics cited in the
various publications in the bibliography end other authori-




4. Fnslgn/2nd Lieutenant grade .
a. Fnslgn/2nd Lieutenant, 0-1 under
2 yrs. service #4,942
b. Civil Service, GS-7, step 4 6,380
c. Foreign Service, FSO-8, step 4 6,380
d. Postal Field Service, PFS-7, step 4 6,550
e. National Average (BLS-1961), private
enterprise for occupational levels
corresponding with Civil Service GS-7 6,876
f. MSTS, Civil Service crews, .June 1962
P2 transport, Junior Deck Officer 6,903 plus
qtrs. &
subsistence
g. Merchant Marine US registry
(1) 25,000 ton tankers, 1958-61
Junior third mate 7,032
(2) 35,000 ton, twin screw, 1960
4th officer 7,308
(3) Graduates of Kings Point Merchant
Marine Academy get Third Mate





The Department of Defense and the services find
they must be competitive in the Indus trial -business man-
power market when hiring management trainee civilian em-
ployees.
Let us consider a fairly typical example:
The Department of Defense in hiring auditor trainees
(The above figures are from statistics cited in the
various publications in the bibliography and other authori-




starts them at C-S-5 (GS-7 if the trainee is in the
upper 25$ of the scholastic standing of his class or
has a B-plus average), after six months the GS-5 is
promoted to GS-7. Twelve months after this advance-
ment he is promoted to GS-9. The following year he
may expect to be advanced to G8-11. The trainee hired
as a GS-7 will be advanced in six months to GS-9, one
year later to GS-11. His promotions ordinarily slow
down and wait for the one hired as GS-5 to catch up.
The graduates of the 1955 and 1956 college classes are
for the most part GS-13 or 14,
TABLE 9
Comparative Advancement of Department




















Class 1955 13 930 Lt. 558
Notes! 1. All GS salaries are for Step 1.
2. Figures are for Basic pay, allowances
and income tax advantages. Ens. and
Lt.Jg without dependents.
On comparative responsibility of a naval
officer and an auditor?
Comment: The lieutenant by now has most probably been
a department head on board ship and ia quali-
fied as an underway watch officer. Possibly he
has been an executive officer or a commanding
officer of a small ship.
Telephone Interview with Mr. Harold Albertson,




Military pay, with the exception of quarters
allowance, has not been increased since 195Q. Kven then
the quarters allowance was only about fifty per cent of
the amount rents had increased since the last adjustment*
Civil Service snd other federal civilian pay was
adjusted in 1958, 1960, 1962, and an increase for 1964
is already enacted. These increases are comparable with
industrial salary/wage rates with the exception of the
higher grades. Military pay does not approach such
comparability.
In recent years the consumer price index (1957-59*
100) has risen about one per cent a year. Over the last
twenty year period it has risen fifty per cent. The
"National Standard of Living" has risen about three per
cent a year during the last few years. Industrial sala-
ries and wages have kept pace.
Soae Lffects of Pay Inadequacy
Many service personnel feel that their dependents
must work or they must "moonlight" (hold a second Job)
to make ends meet, educate children, etc.
In January 196? at • naval shore activity
in a oity, 5.4$ of the officers and 26$
of the enlisted had off-duty outside Jobs?
wives of 14$ of the officers end 35$ of
the enlisteda worked; in the cases of 7%
of the enlisteds, both husbands and wives
had outside jobs.
In January 1963, In a naval 3hore admini-
strative activity with 209 married en-

43
listed men, mostly of middle end senior
r nlightod" or their wives
worked*
In 1962, In a major Fleet type commend
1.5$ of the officers and 6.6$ of the en-
listeds had off-duty jobs; 15. 7# of the
officers and 15.4;.' of the enlisted bad
working wives; but operational schedules
precluded about half of the force from
moonlighting.
Many, Including senior officers, cannot
adequately fund college education for
their children.
In a Fleet type command in 1962 the
average cost per family from personal
funds for permanent changes of station,
over and above government funding for
transportation, per diem, and disloca-
tion allowances, was #233 for officers
and $172 for enlisteds* Average spent
per family for medical/dental care and
drugs outside of military facilities
was $141*
In the same Fleet type command, of the
non-reenllstments in 1862, 27$ gave In-
adequate pay as a principal reason*
5.6% of officer resignations cited pay*
The actual percentages were probably
higher as many are reluctant to so cite
pay. 1
Human Vvsnts are Insatiable; some authorities
might question the real need for moonlighting. Perhaps
the figures below might show what part of the necessity
is* Most people do not like to accept charity.
In 1962, the California Ped Cress distributed
#2,793,000 to military families in interest-free loans
end grants*
In 1962, the Navy Belief Society made loans and
1 Compiled by Vice Admiral T. 0. W. Settle USN (ret.})
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listed men, mostly of middle end senior
r iG-.nllghtod" or their wives
worked*
In 1962, in a major Fleet type command
1.5$ of the officers and 6.6$ of the en-
11 s teds had off-duty Jobs; 15. 7# of the
officers and 15.4;.' of the enlisted bad
working wives; but operational schedules
secluded about half of the force from
moonlighting.
Many, including senior officers, cannot
adequately fund college education for
their children.
In a Fleet type command in 1962 the
average cost pfir family from personal
funds for permanent changes of station,
over and above government funding for
transportation, per diem, and disloca-
tion allowances, was #233 for officers
and $172 for enlisteds. Average spent
per family for medical/dental care and
drugs outside of military facilities
was $141
«
In the same Fleet type command, of the
non-reenlistments In 196?,, 27$ gave -in-
adequate pay as a principal reason.
5.6$ of officer resignations cited pay.
The actual percentages were probably
higher as many are reluctant to so cite
pay. 1
Human wants are insatiable! some authorities
might question the real need for moonlighting. Perhaps
the figures below might show what part of the necessity
Is. Most people do not like to accept charity.
In 1962, the California Fed Cress distributed
12,795,000 to military families in interest-free loans
end grants.
In 1962, the Navy Belief Society mad© loans and
1 Compiled by Vice Admiral T. 0. w. Settle USK (ret.))
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grants to Navy and Marine Corps families:
For hospitalization, 3400 cases: $216,600.00
For basic maintenance and dental oar© of depen-
dents, 48,300 cases: ?' l2,996,000*001
The following extracts from the 1965 Hearings
by the House of Representatives Subcommittee probably
outline the problem better than could any number of
tables of figures. Mr. Blanford, the committee coun-
sel, asked Admiral Smedfcerg:
...•Do you feel the junior officers look
to the increases provided here for the
senior officers, and that this enters in-
to their consideration as to whether they
are going to make a career of the Navy?
Admiral Smedberg answered:
I Dersonally feel very definitely that is
the case, particularly with the best young
officers, the smartest ones, the ones w©
want most to keep.
Shortly thereafter a letter from a Navy Captain
to Mr. Pi vers, chairmen of the committee had, was read
into the record.
In view of the recent pay increases for
professional civil service personnel th©
small amount of information that has
leaked out with respect to th© potential
military pay increases has been most dis-
quieting, in fact, almost insulting.
1
*bld »
U, S., Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 1,
Committee on Armed Services, Hearings to Increase the Petes
of Basic Pay for Members of the Uniformed Services,, and for
Other Purposes , BBth Con/?., 1st Sesa,, 1965, p. 1464»
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At the o §t position level,
civil service personnel will receive approx-
imately a 20 per cf:nt pa;y increase by Janu-
ary 1, 1964, The only information T have
been able to gather with respect to our mili-
tary pay situation obstensibly because 3eo-
r-etery ^c^amara has mnintalned a veil of
secrecy over this matter Is that captains
will be recommended for a pay increase of
about (45 per month. If this is true, then
I find the entire pay situation Insulting
with respect to the military civilian re-
lationships la our activities*
I am not against the pey increases for
our civilian engineers, Their increases
h8ve made their pay somewhat equitable
with their commercial counterparts....
G3-14 and above civilian personnel making
up to approximately f-4,000 more per year
than I will be earning Including allow-
ances as of January 1, 1964. I consider
this to be a most unhealthy command and
management situation. I feel that I con-
tribute just as much technically and con-
siderably more in administration and de-
cision making on technical matters as any
civilian engineer in a certain laboratory.
I am sure that this situation prevails in
other laboratories and activities of the
Navy, and In Ships, perhaps to even a
greater degree
•
My pride has been wounded sorely and
the pride ii about all we have left in
our profession. I would take such retire-
ment action most reluctantly since I have
loved the Navy and it has been fair and
just with me In the past.
Of course, I as an Individual don*t
really count for much In the Navy but I
feel there must be hundreds more who are
going to have the same thoughts and con-
clusions and the Navy and Government can-
.,
not afford to lose our collective services..
It was Intended In the preparation of this paper
1 Ibid., p. 1465,
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to go Into a long discourse on comparative pay» but
this Information has been adequately published by the
Took Commission in 1947, * end again by the Cordiner
Committee In 1957. S
Probably the above letter expresses the inner
feelings of more naval officers better than could any
other single document. It certainly echos the senti-
ments of this writer's present associates*
The junior officer who must make a decision to
"stay in" or "go home'* c&n only look at a Captain with
either scorn or pity end uentslly say, "What has twenty-
five years of your life led you to?"
During the late forties and through the mid-fifties
pay for junior officers was not far out of line with pri-
vate industry. Tor the young single officer receiving
fifty per cent as much as his contempories history does-
n't nean much. For the young married officer on sea duty
Ms wife must work.
Salary Fringes
The pay does not meet the minimum wage standards
for straight time for many military personnel and especial-
ly young officers at sea (excepting they are married).
1 Supra ». 19.
U. 8»j Department of Defense, "A Report and Rec-
ommendation for the Secretary of Defense," Defense Advisory
Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation."





(The young officer underway seven days a week, works
an eighty hour week if ho is standing one in three
watches; doing administrative v/ork only during working
hours when off watch.
)
If the shorter Civil Service or industrial work
week were applied to the officer's work week, then part
of the officer's pay would be figured at time and one-
half. He is assuming a great deal of responsibility
for teenage baby-sitting wages. Everyone else in the
United States would be drawing time and one-half and
double time for a like period.
Fringes
a. Costs of military supplemental and
other compensation for services rendered
&ve 29 to S0# of "Constructive Military
Salary", (i.e., basic pay plus quarters/
subsistence allowances and Federal in-
come tax exemptions therefore, and in-
centive nays), which is the counterpart
of civilian salary/wage, (straight time
pay). Military aupplementals, include
the high accrual costs of retirement/
retainer pays. The percentage trsnd is
downward
•
b. Costs of Civil Service and other
Federal civilian supplemental compen-
sation for services rendered are about
28$ of salary/wage, and trending upward,
c. Costs to industrial employers for
supplemental and other compensation for
services rendered averaged, In 1961, 29
to 30$ of salary/wage. They are trend-
ing strongly upward having about doubled
in percentage since WWII, Both manage-
ment and labor now stress increases in
supplemental. Western European indus-
trial supplemental percentages are gen-




ting costs other than compensation
for services rendered are not Included in
the above at age a for Industry nor for
the Federal civilian and military systems.
oh costs inrlr.de Indennitl.el for injury,
niokness and death, indemnities for expenses
incurred by Ind als while rencerlng
services, and costs essentially for
ers* or the government's purposes such as
company stores end cafeterias, commissaries
and exchanges, athletic and recreational
facilities, training nnd education, etc. "
Supra





Perhaps th© very word "fringe" leaves this
area a little vague* Generally speaking there are two
kinds or groupings of fringe benefits: 1* The legal
group which Includes survivor benefits, disability bene-
fits and the various veterans 1 benefits such as burial
In a national cemetery, etc. 2* The second and more
elusive—dependents medical care, exchanges, commissaries,
entertainment and recreation facilities, etc*
The first group recently has been given a sound
base* It will probably serve the military well for years
to come as long as it gets an occasional overlook f To
be sure th© ever-rising cost of living and standard of
living doe 8 not undermine it*
Group two Is a story with a different color and
flavor* Civilians are always telling military men what
fin© fringe benefits the military man has* The con-
ceived ideas in men's minds chang© much slower than the
true state of affairs* The Individual business man,
with his eye on the profit motive and not troubling him-
self to consider what might b© In the best interest of
the nation, fakes continual snipes at service facilities
to cut them off or fore© prices so high there Is no ad-
vantage* In other areas competition in the civilian




lower than the exchange prices
•
There is money to be saved by patronizing the
exchange and patronizing must be done by service personnel.
For the wise it is not done blindly. During the past
Christmas season, toys which were ten dollars in the
Washington area exchanges were eight dollars or less in
local stores* At this writing bread and milk are less
expensive in the Ft, Myer commissary, but meat cost less
at the A k P stores where there are regular weekly sale
prices on meat. Drinks are less In many California cock-
tail lounges than in the officers* clubs, and so it goes
across the nation. In Long Beach, California, during 1960,
dairies were trying to force up low bidders so the price
of milk would be raised in the Navy Commissary, In Charles-
ton, S, C, in 1957, the push was against the package stores.
In some areas, military organizations are required to have
union permission for a military band to perform at their
own dances when they are held in civilian establishments.
So it goes; each individual says he is only look-
ing out for his own interest. However, those Individuals
cover the sum total of American economy and as a result
blanket the fringe benefits.
Some individuals feel that the pay of the military
man is public money and that anyway you can get your
hand into the public coffers is alright because it does-
n't belong to anyone anyway.




Take effective, continuing action to
reestablish and maintain appropriate
"fringe benefits" for service personnel
and their dependents. •• .Since World War
II the quality of these former service
benefits has seriously eroded while
simultaneously they have become firmly
established and greatly expanded in
civilian compensation practices.^-
The following table presents a list of fringe bene-
fits for the employees of industry. It will readily be
seen that direct comparison with the fringe benefits of
servicemen cannot be made on the information presented
here, but a general concept may be realized.
1 Supra ., 46.

TABLE 10
Fringe Payment as Per Cent of Payroll 1961
Total, All
Type of Payment Industries
Total fringe payments as per cent of payroll • • • 24,9
1. Legally required payments (employer's share
only) • • • • 5.1
a. Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance. 2.7
b. Unemployment Compensation ••••••••• 1.5
c. Workmen's compensation (incl. est. cost for
self-insured). . 0.8
d. Railroad Retirement Tax, Railroad Unemploy-
ment insurance, state sickness benefits
insurance, etc. ** 0.1
2. Pension and other agreed-upon payments (employer's
share only) 7.9
a. Pension plan premiums and pension payments •
not covered by Insurance-type plan (net).. 4.2
b. Life Insurance premiums, death benefits,
sickness, accident and medical-care Insur-
ance premiums, hospitalization insurance
etc. (net) • • •• 2.7
c. Contributions to privately financed unem-
ployment benefit funds ..........0.1
d. Separation or termination pay allowances • • 0.1
e. Discounts on goods and services purchased
from company by employees 0.1
f. Employee meals furnished by company • • • • 0.4
g. Miscellaneous payments (compensation pay-
ments in excess of legal requirements,
payments to needy employees, etc.) • • • 0.5
3. Paid rest periods, lunch periods, wash-up time,
travel time, clothes-change time, get-ready time
etc • 2.6
4. Payments for time not worked ••••••••• 7.6
a. Paid vacations and bonuses in lieu of vaca-
tion • . . . 4.2
b. Payments for holidays not worked 2,5
c. Paid sick leave ••••• 0.7
d. Payments for State or National Guard duty,
jury, witness and voting pay allowances,
payments for time lost due to death in






Fringe Payments as Per Cent of Payroll 1961x
Total, All
Type of Payment Industries
5. Other Items * # • • • • • » • 1*7
a. Profit-sharing payments ........ 0.8
b. Christmas or other special bonuses,
service awards, suggestion awards, etc* 0.7
c. Kmployee education expenditures (tui-
tion refunds, etc.) • ••••••••
d. Special wage payments ordered by courts,
payments to union stewards, etc. . • • 0.2
Less than 0.05$,
Comparative Values
Defense Study Group on Military Compensation (1962)
put the following dollar amounts on military fringe bene-
fits (value to military officer)
Exchanges . $27.13
Commissaries » • • • « 46,20





2These figures are based on cost to the government.
The Chamber of Commerce reported, the average pay-
ment in 1961 for fringe benefits (for the items shown in
table 10, p. 52 was 24.9$ of payroll, or 61.6^ per pay-
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Fconomic
Research Dept., Fringe Benefits 1961 , (Washington, D, C.
1962) p. 13.
p




roll hour, or fl,254 per year per employee.
Trend of Industry Fringe Payments
For ninety-one Identical companies the coat of
fringe benefits has risen from 14,6^ In 1947, to 16,3$ In
1949, 18. 3# in 1951, 20. 2# in 1953, 21. 7# in 1955, 24. 1#
in 1957, 24.7,<£ in 1959 to 26.4% in 1962. 2
Civil Service ^ringo Benefits Cost
The cost of Civil Service benefits are closely
comparable to those In industry with a slightly higher
cost for the civil servant.
1 Supra., »• P« 5 -
Supra ., 53, p. 5.
Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., The Salary
Equivalent of United States Civil Service Employee Benefits ,
A report, prepared for the Defense Advisory Committee on
Professional and Technical Compensation, osd. (New York:




Tn the early eighteen hundreds an officer drew
full pay only when at sea, hence there was a differential
for sea pay* Sea and foreign duty pay was In effect from
1942 until the Hook Commission urged It to be withdrawn
1for officers.
The old cliche that navy men Join the Navy to
see the sea Is helieved reverently by many navy men*
However, it is no excuse to withdraw sea pay. The de-
mands certainly do not weigh any less on the officers.
Crows of commissioned ships of the Navy,
in 1961, averaged 68% of nights away from
home because of absence from homa ports
and l-In-4 days duties when in home ports*
Four ship typos averaged above 8P^.^
If the burden of going to sea, with the attendant
separation from dependents and the added expense fell to
everyone on a rotation basis there would be little con-
cern**" Some groups of officers expect only one, or at
the most, two tours of sea duty in a career* For many
officers (staff and specialists) there are no afloat-
jobs. While the Hook Commission recommended see pay not
Sttpr<u , 19, Advisory Commission on Service Pay,
1948, p. 155T
2 Supra * » p* 35, Settle*
3 Supra * , 44, Pay for Members of the Uniformed




be paid to officers, they recommended a w flat rata
increase, aa in keeping with accepted industry practice
lor disagreeable or unpleasant work and as a morale
factor," for enlisted men,-1-
In 1953, the otrauas Commission followed the
theme of the took Commission on sea pay with the same
comments about the increased expense for those at sea.
They also included the fact that everyone takes a turn
o
at sea duty*
A fair insight to the cause and effect of sea pay
and retention problems can be seen in the graphs and
tables 26 through 29.3 With the extra income of flight
pay, dollars Is not a principal factor for naval avia-
tors. For the other officer groups dollars is not a
factor as the expense associated with separation from
dependents is small. But for the lire officer, dollars
is a major factor in conjunction with dependents* sepa-
ration as a major factor. They cannot be separated and
are really one issue instead of two.
Supra . , 19, Advisory Commission on Service Pay,
1948, p. 29.
2
U. S., Senate, Report of the Strauss Commission
on Incentive-Hazardous and Special Pays, 8Srd Cong., 1st





Is retired pay a fringe benefit or a deferred
payment for services performed? What it is likely to
become in the not too distant future is a whipping-boy
for the election campaigner, and those tasking economy
drives on the national budget.
Retired pay or retainer pay has a long standing
history in the military organizations of the western
world. The use of the term "retired pay" and the vocab-
ulary associated with it by Civil Service pnd private
industry is somewhat blinding its proper application
to the military*
The traditional method of computing retired pay
had t>aen on the basis of applicable active duty rates.
Recruiters and officer procurement offices sold the Navy
to young men (undoubtedly the other services did the
same) highlighting this feature of the military l It was
the only economic feature to Mghlight.
Congress In 1922 departed from the traditional
method of computing retired pay on the basis of the
regular pay scale. It would appear that the departure
was not the intent of Congress, but the interpretation
of the Comptroller of the Treasury. The Comptroller
General believed Congress could not make the change.
Suffice it to say, with the ensuing argument, the next




on the 1922 pay scale for retirees.
This to the military was the indelible stamp of
approval on the tried and proven method. This thought
was on the minds of many when they entered the service
or made their decision to be career military. To those
who retired prior to 1958, it was a bitter pill when
Congress repudiated what the officers had been led to
believe was their just and earned due. What was said
in the Senate in 1926 Is as valid today as it was then?
....while granting the benefits of the
new pay legislation to all officers who
retire after July 1, 1922, deprives all
officers retired prior to that date of
said benefits, thereby violating the
basic law under which these officers
gained their retirement rights. 2
If the reward for the service of time is to be dis*
counted at the end of its tenure of office, then it is
logical to assume that the door has been opened for repu-
diating the service of dollars by cancelling the interest
on government bonds.* Patriotism is founded on (among
other things) belief, honor and respect, end to shake or
break one of its foundations is to weaken its whole
structure.
To those committed to a service career, mentally,
U. S., Congress, House, Committee Military Affairs,
Report #926 , 67th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-2, and U. S.,
Congress, House, Committee ?£ilitary Affairs, Report #236.
68th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4.
2
Supra
. » 44, Hearings to Increase the Rates of Basio
Pay for Members of the Uniformed Services . 1963. p. 1538.
3
Supra., 44, Hearings to Increase the Fates of Basic
Pay for Members of the Uniformed Services . 1963, p. 1679.
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morally, or financially, the changing of rules for
only one side (in the game of life), is like passing
the point of no return on a voyage, and finding the
remaining fuel is half water.
The following excerpts from a statement by
Congressmen V-'ilson, Oubser, and Chamberlain appeared in
Navy Times:
According to established scales of com-
parability with civil service, active
ty military personnel have always been
underpaid* Part of this has been made
up through noncontributor retirement,
hospital benefits, commissary privileges,
and other benefits. I;ven after decreas-
ing compax*able civil service pay by the
6g—per cent retirement deduction and in-
creasing mi iitary pay to include the
taxes which are not paid on subsistence
and quarters allowance, the pay of a
colonel under this bill is almost $200
a month below that of his civil service
counterpart*
••••It is a common error to state that
the military retiree does better than this
civil service counterpart. The truth is
that the military man who serves a full
30 years is not doing as well as the civil
servant who gets longevity and can in-
crease his "high 5" average yc-fcrs. After
30 years of service he can go up to as
high as 80 per cent of his "high E n average*
On the other hand, the military man gets
only 75 per cent of his basic pay and If
not given retirement credit for his allow-
ances. Figures clearly show that the
civil servant draws more retirement pay
than military men of equal rank and equal
years of service. After 2jr to 3 years, the
civilian has gotten back all of his con-
tribution. •• ..Military retired pay is not
conceived as a pension and hss never been
Navy Times, April 24, 1963, p. 2.
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considered as such. In the case of
United States V. Hooper (USCMA 643-645)
in 1958, the Court of Military Appeals
held in part:
Officers on the retired list are
not mere pensioners in any sense
of the word. • . .selaries thet they
receive are not solely recompensed
for psst services, but e means de-
vised by Congress to assure their
availability. ,. .in future contin-
gencies.
This is why members of the retired list are
still subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
As cited by the Court of Military Appeals, a retired
military officer is not a pensioner and he is bound by
various laws and regulations which:
1. Make him amenable to courts -martial.
2. Restricts his employment in both civil and
private employment
•
3. Restricts and supervises his travels and
expressions of thought.
4. Makes him liable for recall to active duty.
And—a moral code of good conduct and ethics is expected
of them by their fellow citizens above that which is
prescribed for the average civilian*
To accept the idea of the cost of living increases
for retired personnel where our standard of living Is
spiralling is analogous to giving them the "'old age pen-
sions" of many states. For the wife, who has the mis-
fortune of outliving her husband, the widow's mite could
easily become her due.
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Military men have the right to retire In twenty
years?
For enlisted men at the end of their last enlist-
ment that exceeds fcwent rs, this is true.
For officers thil Ik not ao true a a able
to retire, but \ aually t 1 s btetuil they have not been
promoted. !%* "up or cut" for the convenience of the
government,
]Vhy pay f retirement when he is ao young and he
a
all that experience j and has such a long-expected life*
Part of the answer can be seen in the Civil Ser-
vice Retirement Fund problems. It's cheaper to move
them out when they are younger for several reasons
:
1, If they are to be retained and have any Ini-
tiative they hi; ft have some promotions, and with pro-
motions their eventual retirement costs go up higher
than earlier costs,
2, Promotions are stagnated. Tin tates
has some sad lessons in history to support this —the
experiences following the War of 1818, the Civil '"sr,
and the Spanish American War, when the country was sad-
dled with oldsters who couldn't perform or take the phy-
sical gaff,
8i The "retired personnel" provide a powerful
ready reserve of "know how" to quickly organize for
1 Roland Barber, "l Comparison of Costs," TTnltad
States Naval Institute Proceedings , August, 1937, p, 1561,
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limited or total war.
4. Retiring the younger man requires less cost
for maintenance of personnel and health. Their depen-
dents are fewer and younger 30 requiring less elaborate
facilities. These retired young gfcta are replaced by
seventeen year olds (enlisted), or twenty-two year old
officers with possibly no dependents.
5. Survivor benefits for casualitles are less.
6. Combat conditions require young healthy men
who can move fast.
Service at 3ea in particularly requires physical
stamina. Every ship Is an around-the-clock operation,
whore for many, eight hours of uninterrupted sleep during
a cruise is not possible.

CITAPTF-H VII
PAY AND Tit IBir/ITY
The various commissions andl study groups resigned
to analyze .military ttion over the last fifteen
years have tried to equ? « illtary pry and responsibility
with governmental groups end private industry, 2'hiie
government emplojrees whether civil service, appointed,
or politicel can be stratified by equivalent ranks, this
cannot bo don* in attempting to equate management in
industry with naval officers.
• military officer besides having the normal re-
sponsibility for his job has an additional responsibility
for Mb actions to be in the best interests of his country*
This "befit interests of the country'* is seldom heard in
other quarters, as Congressmen try to reach into the pork
barrel. More often than once the military organizations
have tried to cut expenses by closing unnecessary instal-
lations, but sons vested interest in Ocngrr 11 have
none of it, when it hits bis home district. In the busi-
ness world there have been continuous attacks on the
fringe benefits of the mll'tary such as commissaries,
exchanges, and clubs.
For the officer in conHnand, his responsibility
stays with him when he goes home at night, to a party,
or anywhere else, until someone else succeeds to command*
Kis responsibility for the well being of the personnel




He even has a responsibility for their conduct when they
are on liberty and for their remarks about security
matters.
An example of the magnitude of this: The Command*
ing Officer of the escort vessel Yvith the ill-fated sub-
marine, Thresher, who has been named n an interested
party" for his failure to report a garbled message and
various sounds. It is doubtful that this would have
helped the Thresher. There is nothing unusual in the
board of investigation* a action, but this would undoubt-
edly be foreign to a civilian.
Pew professions, however, demand the high
degree of education, combined with eternal
vigilance only occasionally tested, which
is required of naval officers. 1
It is readily recognized that responsibility csn
not be bought for money. However, "discontent with fi-
nancial rewards is a powerful disincentive , undermining
and corroding responsibility for performance."* Mone-
tsry rewards motivate only where other things have made
the worker ready to assume responsibility.
If one wants to test the above concept, let him
go to work for a week having less than B dollar, or no
1 Jonathan f. Howe, Lieutenant {30) , n Time of
Decision, " United States "aval Institute Proceedings ,
January 1962, p. 3-.
o
Peter r. Trucker, The Practic e of Management,
(New York; Harper k Brothers, "1954;, p7 363.'
'

more than h to one's own lunch each day
and no blank cheGks or credit cards. The next week
let him carry one hundred dollars in hi a billfold*
It will ao difference Cher he buys anyone lunch
or a drink, act is he cen end ' f It. And
he was consciously aware the week before that he had to
be careful of whom he met and where,
.
ressive-
ness, willingness to ma*. visions and accept w
sibility would undoubtedly show a marked difference,
il'tary services are much more decentra-
lized than many outsiders tend to think. Is is
especially significant in the Nsvy, where many commission-
ed ships are commended by junior- officers. These officers
have demonstrated t sense of, and a willingness to assume,
responsibility, hut they must remain aggressive and de-
cisive or disaster will strike.
*• Charles J. Hitch and j.oland «'!. ..o-
nomlca of Defense in the Nuclear Afte , ( C ambri dge : Harvard





. ... it aajor officer personnel nroblara is
the acquisition and retention of unrestric-
ted line officers to ;nan the " the
future, T dey there is an imbalance of
ofricera, which Boentuated in the lieu-
tenant and lieutenant commander ranks,
where there is a serious deficit of about
3,000 unrestricted line officers* The sit-
uation is aggravated by haying insufficient
officers with scientific and engineering
baccalaureate degrees and the high e
standing needed to meet postgraduate require-
ments .
• »»*Ai we move toward 1973, our need;? for
officers in quantity and quality will in-
crease. Our problems oan ba axpected
and, unless Measures are innovated to
relieve them. Plana for the procurement
and training of personnel will have to be
aospatll th ru ibs < at tha
m time, the training cannot be restrict-
ed solely to technological skills. The
Navy still has to be prepared to fip:ht at
sea. This is a military ] resent vhich
is a specialty in itself—to e military
service the most Important speelalty*
Fulfilling the Teed
"nfortunately it is isibl--* to leasure what
is enough for defense. This is equally true in cueasuring
the caliber cf len who man and direct tha anae«
The unrestricted 11m the co«aan< f the
Navy, and with a 5000 officer ihorl It b« obvious
the Nary has less of a field to pick f n the selec-
William R, S«edber<« III, Vice il, ,3. Navy,
"Manning the Future Fleets," U» S, Naval Institute Proceed-
ings* January 1965, p. 122,

tion of its Admirals* If selection boards must dip
down they must spcriflc experience levels. It is expect-
ed the officers selected will meet the "test", if put to
it, but written




• Pilling the requirement for 15.000 >fflcers in
the regular estHblis f the .7,
there were 10,000 spplleentSf 3tf bhat number j )0
were selected.
In the hearings before the House o'S' psenta-
t' ves, Mr, Cordlner made this remark:
....of the officers who reenlisted in
fiscal 1956, 78 per cent of them did not
neasure up to fc nrerage proficiency of
the professional man they wanted. Unless
we have s ehange in compensation, motiva-
tion, and reward, I don»t think you can
hold the Defense 1 Btabllshsssnt account-
able and say 1t is a failure, when they
reenlist these marginal fellows a because
that ig the only thing they can do pres-
ently.
Moat personnel managers feel it is abac ly essential
to have three applicants to fill each vacancy,
f ilowing eactract makes one wonder if the Navy hasn't felt
a reduction in quality due to its inability to be selec-
tive in filling its needs—needs resulting from T 'nited
States policy.
Supra
. , SO | Senate hearings (58), [arc 2, p. 203,
^pra., Z, Method of Computing Basic Pay, House,
1958, p. 5i95.

The Commanding Officer of one ship proudly
suggested thet some aonnr experts might
learn something from his ship's sonar
•
Though it was a standard model, it con»i»-
tently obtained echo ranges 50 per cent
greater then 3: sonara In
of the same squadron. The experts did, in
fact, learn sow learned that
the range scales in question v*ere reading-
50 ,cr cent . >r than * ihould have.
•lie Congress would like to ley the blame at the
feet of the services, for failing to retain sufficient
Junior officers, it is qu >ssible that the major
part of the human, error orooerly lies with Congreea*
For a hundred years the services have ber>n telling
Congress what the basic philosophy »n, ad aarioana
in particular, is—that young men look at the man at the
top and try to determine if they are what to 1 s to;
if not they look elsewhere. ..ut, rasa as a body,
has not listened. krom the period following the 1003
pay raise until the 1958 pay raise they have continued
to compresa the ialarlea between junior enlisted neis to
tains, and fron Lieutenants jur
Captains. (flag officers are net considered, as they
are outside the normal career pattern, and their lot
would on -1 " - ke things sound worse.)
It Bight be argued that the ratio e Lieu tenant
junior grade ct hit income to inerei y the
Allan N. Olennon, Lieuton* 5 Tk S«
Navy, "Heeded '^ore Professionals," United ..,t^5ea Naval
Institute Proceed; nys
,
September 1962, p. 59*
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time he is promoted to Captain has only varied from
2.72 tlmea In 1908, to 2.22 in lt48, to B,M ^n 1955
• Irble 2). This night Iwve some i ,erit if onl;
coat of lining v/ero involved, but It gives r
tion to the increased standard of living the Majority
of . eana enjoy. Management philosophers will readi-
ly agw»e that there can be no te of homeostasis in
an organization which competes In the a economy.
And compete the /rrried Forces must, for its officer.1-
•
rasa haa, unwittingly or otherwise, done
two other things to aggravate the situation,
rst, they have not seon fit to raise the pay
of an Enalgn for the last ten years* It has been argued
and with superficial larlt that every - n has the
obligation to F.ervt it of his abili-
ty, with honor and distinction. not - mericans
are required to do ao«
For those who must i t often b -cones a
choice of two years in the ' or two to f oars rs
an officer. the "honor" hat ..-ted away
end the one who -s
from th. lor of serve out feism*
When the young ~ns' ids
that uaual!l
?y, the binctl
FiOt the Ensign la ha s~ srs
responsible for the action jlviliana who make more
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than he does, Admirals who receive no increase in
retirement benefits for staying beyond thirty years
•
If the Ensign looks down he sees himself responsible
for people making more than he. If he looks sideways
he sees his friends calling him a sucker. Then he asks,
"Why should I stay in?" 1
Second, Congress has not seen fit to keep mili-
tary compensation up to equivalent governmental salaries
by the rank structure, let alone by responsibility. 2
It must appear to them that with the hump supply of
senior officers, there was no need to raise the pay of
senior officers. In addition when an officer serves ten
or more years he has a vested Interest in his retirement
and as a careerist, hence he can be bought cheaply. (See
Tables 11 through 19.5
Perhaps Congress looks askance at anyone who pleads
for a pay increase where he or his superiors would person-
ally benefit.
.... Public opinion tends to cling to a
traditional concept of the rules and
duties of the military and its officers.
On the opposite hand, it acknowledges the
trend and magnitude of technological change
evident in these epochal times.... In the
case of military management, the gulf be-
1 Supra ., 19, Commission on Service Pay . 1948, p. 2.
o
John Pord, "A Comparison of Military Pay and
Benefits with those of U. S. Civilian Employees," Navy Times ,





tween reality and public concept is even
greater.
*
••••the difference between the character
of the naval officer and other military
officers lies in the degree to which he
displays responsible initiative * . ..if
there was one difference between a Navy
man, regardless of rank, he had some
authority to make decisions, exercise
initiative, and not buck every little
question up to the captain or the colonel."
Supra., 46, Defense Advisory Committee on Pro-
fessional and Technical Tompensatlon, 1957, p. 77.
2 DeLa Mater, Stephen T., Commander, IT. S. Navy,
"The Navy Image", United States Naval Institute Proceed-
ings . April 1963, p. £e.

PART III
THE DESIRE FOR INCREASED PAY AND ITS
RFLATION TO THE ECONOMICS OF FAMILY SEPARATION

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE
The survey sample of Navy Officers on ectlve
duty was selected by assigned blocks of 1000 officers,
each to Atlantic end Pacific Fleets, through their re-
spective personnel accounting machine installation (PAMI)
at Norfolk, Virginia and San Diego, California, Another
block of 500 officers were assigned to (PAMI), continen-
tal United States at Beinbridge, Maryland. The PAMI
a
selected the individual officers by computer to get ran-
dom selection with even distribution in the various parts
of question 22 and by rank distribution, grades 0-1
through 06, in eccordence with the current navy rank dis-
tribution. (Survey date as of May 62).
EAM cards were prepared at PAMI's location and
forwarded to the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department,
Washington, D. C. The Bureau after reproducing the csrds
and filing a set turned them over to the Department of
Defense, Military Compensation Study Group. From a re-
production of this set of cards this study was made.
In making for this thesis an analysis of selected
information from these cards over two hundred passes of
the twenty-five hundred card deck were made or in excess
of one half million individual card passes.
IBM 101, #84 and #85 card sorters were used and




The 101, printed out card information which was
transferred by hand to a mimegraphed form which is
shown in appendix D. When sorting was done on machines
other than the IBM 101 the information was recorded di-




The questionnaire was designed by Colonel William
H. Corbett, U.S.A., Mr* K. J. Fotocko, end Mr. F, V. >'cCurdy,
of the Department of Defense Study Group on Military Com-
pensation. Revision for naval personnel was done by Mr.
Mark Biegel, in charge of the Mobilization and Morale Re-
search Program, Personnel Research Division, Bureau of
Personnel, Navy Department.
The questionnaire contained forced choice answers
to the questions which were designed for mechanical (EAM)
and electronic (ADP) processing. That 13, the respondent
had to check one of the given answers to .each question.
Of the thirty-eight questions asked, sixteen were
control questions, which the respondent would answer the
same way, no matter how often he was asked. An example
is question "1M : "If you received a temporary promotion
on active duty during the period 16 May 1961 - 15 May 1962,
how much active federal commissioned service had you com-
pleted at that time?
Of the twenty-five hundred officers surveyed,
twenty-four hundred and fifty responses were available
for this study. Where the number of responses to e ques-
tion do not total the above number it is most likely due
to one of the three following conditions: (1) the
officer involved did not respond to the question, (2)




card might not pass through the sorter and would have
to be reproduced. On occasion this would Involve a
delay, hence the run would be completed and the new card
would be inserted into the deck during the run on the
following question.

OFFICER VmSOWKKL QUE8fI0imAII« (MCSG)5-62
1, If you received e temporary promotion on cctive duty
during the period 16 ?4ey 1961 - 16 May 1962, how much
active federal commissioned service had you completed
» t that time?
1 (66) I am a warrant officer so this question does
not apply to me
2 (1669) I am a commissioned officer but did not re-
ceive a temporary promotion on active duty
during this period
I did receive a temporary promotion on active
duty during 16 May 1961 - 15 May 1962 and
I had completed the following ACTIVF. Federal
commissioned service at that time:
3 (78) Less than 1 year
4 (^gQj 1 year but less than 2

















3 years but less than 4
4 years but less than 5
5 years but less than 6
6 years but less than 7
7 years but less than 8







9 years but less than 10
10 years but less than 11
11 years but less than 12
12 years but less than 13
13 years but less than 14
14 years but less than 15
(8) 15 years but less than 16*
mmmmmmm
16 years but less than 17
__





18 years but less than 19
19 years but less than 20
20 years but less than 21
21 years but less than 22
22 years or more





2. If you are a commissioned officer and received a
temporary promotion on active duty during the period
16 May 1961 - 15 May 1962, what was your age at the
time of your promotion?
1 (68) I am a Warrant Officer so this question does
not apply to me
2 (1633) I am a commissioned officer but did not re-
ceive a temporary promotion on active duty
during this period
I did receive a temporary promotion on active
duty during 16 May 1961 - 15 May 1962 and





















4 \\ 4 < 43 - 45
5
i
4 46 - 48





What is the highest level of education which you
expect someday to attain? (Include OED equivalent)
Check one only.
1 (199) I do not expect to take any more educational
courses or training
I expect at some future date to:
Complete grammar school
Graduate from high school
Graduate from a vocational or trade school
Complete two years of college
Graduate from college (AB, BS)
Graduate from law school (LL .B)
Obtain a masters degree (MA, MS, FTC.)
Obtain a doctoral degree (PhD, DSc, DEd, etc.)
Obtain a degree in medicine (MD)
Obtain some other graduate degree
Take courses not leading to a diploma or degree



























Do you expect to make more or leas xise of your skills
8nd abilities after you leave or retire from the Navy
than you have used or will use these skills In the Navy?
1 (764) More use of my skills and abilities after I
leave the Navy
2 (203) T/ftss use of my skills and abilities after I
leave the Navy
3 (1135) About the same use of my skills and abilities
after I leave the Navy
4 (324) Don't know
Row much do you think your training and experiences







(1619 )^111 probably help a great deal
(528 )Will probably help somewhat
(89 )W111 probably help very little
T3T)W111 probably not help at all
(122 ) Have no idea how much it will help
(^a JDon't plan on working in civilian life
The Navy has a program which provides for appointing
selected enlisted men in grade T>6 or higher with over
eight years of service to Ensign.
These commissioned individuals can complete their
military careers, up to the total of 30 years of ser-
vice, as officers and retire as officers, up to the
maximum grade of Commander, if they have served ten
or more years in officer status.
Do you believe this program attracts more well quali-





(1075 )Yes, and is In the best interests of the
service




If you were soon to leave the Navy, how difficult do
you think It would be to find o Job equal to your
present one? (Fqual as to pay, satisfaction, benefits
interest, challenge, etc.)
1 (573) Very easy

30
2 ( *5?>) Fairlv easy
3 (606) Fairly difficult
4 306) very difficult
5 (294) Don't know how difficult it would be
9. What do you expect to do when you leave active duty in
the Navy?
Check one only
1 (92) Faven't thought much about it
2 (561) Have thought about it, but have no definite
plans







Skilled craft (carpenter, plumber, etc.)
Technioal work (electronics, X-ray, etc.)
A (242) Teaching
B ' (15) Farming
C (55) Government service
D (2) Factory work
E (319T Professional (doctor, lawyer, etc.)
F (101 * Other work than listed above
G (20) Will probably not work
10. Have you decided to make the Navy your career?
A (1497 )1 definitely will make the Navy my career.
B (416 )1 definitely will not make the Navy my career.
I am undecided but would be more likely to
make the Navy my career if:
(Mark only the one condition which would have
the most influence on your decision)
C (24) My present billet was changed





My contribution to national defense was greater
F (56) My promotion opportunity was improved
Q (91) ^y psy ®nd allowances were sufficient to meet
the demands of a Navy career
H (5) I was sure that the Navy would give me a




(6) Fringe benefits, such as commit series, depen-
dent medical cere, etc. were Improved
' (21
)
E h8d e bettor social opportunity and more
personal freedom In the Navy
K (97) I could have my dependents with me more of
the time
I (24) My opportunities for travel and new experi-
ences was greater
M (92) Changes other then above were made
B« wnieh of the above letters (0 through L) do you con-
sider the condition which would have the second most
influence on your decision? Write the letter you
select in the space below,
_______
is the second most influential condition
#The response to this question was as follows:
present billet was changed
present station was changed
contribution to national defense was greater
promotion opportunity was improved
pay and allowances were sufficient to meet
demands of a Navy career
I was sure that the Navy would give me a sepa-
ration bonus if Iwere ever involuntarily
discharged
I (58) Fringe benefits, such as commissaries, depen-
dent medical cere, etc. were improved
J" (53) I had a better social opportunity and more
personal freedom in the Navy
K (155) I could have my dependents with me more of the
time
' (47) My opportunities for travel and new experi-
ences was greater
M (52) Changes other then above were made
C, Which of the above letters (C through L) do you con-
sider the condition which would have the least in-
fluence on your decision? Write the letter you select
in the space below.
is the least influential condition.
The response to this question was as follows:
^Many officers did not respond to parts E and C of
question 10. Tt is assumed that they are primarily the




C (147) My present billet was changed
D (lift
)





wy contribution to national defense wes greater
F ^11^ My promotion opportunity was improved
G (19
j
My pay and allowances were sufficient to
meet the demands of 8 ftavy career
H (249^ I was sure that the Navy would q? ve me a
separation bonus if I were ever involun-
tarily discharged
I (00) Fringe benefits, such as commissaries, de-
pendent medical care, etc. were improved
J (186) I had a better social opportunity and more
personal freedom in the Navy
K (40) I could have my dependents with me raore of
the time
L (116) My opportunities for travel and new experi-
ences was greater
11. Have you decided to leave the Navy before retirement?
A (1515 )1 definitely will make the Navy my career,
end stay in the Navy until retirement.
£ (454 )1 definitely will not make the Navy my career,
and will leave the Navy before my retirement
date.
I am undecided but would be more likely to
leave the Navy before retirement if:
(Mark only the one condition which would
have the most influence on your decision)
(7) My present billet was changed
(5; My present station was changed
My promotion opportunities were less
My pay and allowances were less than I expect
to get
G (15) My pej on retirement was less
H (10) Fringe benefits, such as, commissaries, and
dependent medical care, etc. were decreased
I (32) I had less personal freedom and fewer social
opportunities
J (67) I cannot have my dependents with me as such
as I have had
K (21) My opportunities for travel and new experiences
were less
L (56) Changes other than those above were made
B. Which of the above letters (C through K) do you con-
sider the condition which would have the second most
influence on your decision? Write the letter you
select in the space below.
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is the second moat Influential condition.
The response oo this question was as follows:
G (2g) My present billet was changed
T) ' 20 j ¥y present station was changed
TlJ6
J
My promotion opportunities v?ere leas
F (817) My pay and allowances were less than I expect
to get
(t (108) My pay on retirement was less
(30) fringe benefits, such as, commissaries, and
dependent medical care, etc.
I ( 68) I had less personal freedom rind fewer social
opportunities
J (130) I cannot have my dependents with me as such
as t have had
(44) My opportunities for travel and new experiences
were less
C.**Which of the above letters (C through K) do you con-
sider the condition which would have the least in-
fluence on your decision? Write the letter you select
in the apace below.
* is the least influential condition.
*The response to this question was as follows:
C
( j.33? My present billet vas changed
D (162
j
My present station was changed
k (11; My promotion opportunities were less
F (17) My pay and allowances were less than I expect
to get
(34) My pay on retirement was less
H (95] Fringe benefits, such as, commissaries, and
dependent medical care, etc. were decreased
X (151) I had less personal freedom and fewer social
opportunities
3 (41) X cannot have my dependents with me as such
as I have had
K (164) My opportunities for travel and new experiences
" were less
12. If your total compensation (pay, allowances, and
benefits) were increased how would you like to re-
ceive the increase?
*"* tfany officers did not respond to parts B and C of
Question 11. It is assumed that they are primarily the
ones who answered nAn , "I definitely will make the Navy
ray career, and stay in the Navy until retirement."
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(Select Only Or I aer)
1 (" r 2) Tn brae pr.y
2 (£.27) In. allowances (quarters, subsistence, etc.)
3 (roi) T v and tillovrfancas
4 (10) Ii del bonuses
5
[
Tn t "V. separation op retirement
6 (134) In more retired pay
7
__
' Tn fringe benefit! (dependent medical cere,
commissaries, etc.)
26) In ;>ey, rllowances, and special bonuses
pay, allowances, and lump sum for releese
retirement
pay, allowances, and fringe benefits
pay, allowances, and retired pay
way or combination of ways not listed
15. Assume that there might be an increase of retirement
compensation. If your compensation upon retirement
from the Navy were increased, what kind of an increase
would you prefer?
If I could choose, I would prefer an increase ofr
1 ( 1273
)
tlOO per month increase in my pension
2 (645; $50 per month increase in my pension and $5,000
in a lump sum payment upon retirement
3 (£63) Ho increase in pension, and I (10*000 lump sum
payment upon retirement
14« Where ere your dependents now living?
1 ( 502 ) I have no dependents, therefore this question
does not apply to me
My dependents (dependent) live:
2 f251 With *e in quarters which are furnished by the
government
3 (751 With me in quarters owned by me
4 (718? With me in rented quarters
5 (10; Aw8y from me in quarters which are furnished
by the government
6 ( 30 Away from me in quarter owned by me
7 (129) Away from me in rented quarters











I draw only part of ray allowance
4 '°) I don't know
17. When do you plan to voluntarily retire from active
military service?
1 (628) T do not intend to stay in the Navy until
retirement
T intend to retire when I have completed the
following number of years of Active Federal
litrr. ilcf
:
2 (363) 20 or more but less than 22
? (183) 22 or more but less than 24
4 < 1 61 ) 24 or -"ore but !•• than 26
5 (l42) 26 or more but less than 28
6 (95
)
28 or more but less then 30
7 (763) 30 or more
18. How much do you think your annual Income will be two
years after you leave the Navy? (Do not include, re-
tired pay.
)
1 (115) I do not expect to work
and earn:I expect to work
(51) Less than £2,000
(17) f2,000 to 2, 499
(16) IS, 600 to 2,999
(13) f3,000 to 3,599
tzk ) £3,500 to 3,999
" &4,000 to 4,499
('98) $4,500 to 4,999
9 ( 304 |6,000 to 5,999
A ' (335) f.6,000 to 6,999
B (296) #7,000 to 7,999
(366) §3,000 to 9,999
D (477 f10, 000 to 14,999
E U59) 1 15, 000 to 24,999








19. After leaving the Navy what do you think your annual
income will be at the peak of your civilian career?























20. During the past four weeks, on the sverege, how many




During the past four weeks I was absent from
my regular place of duty for more than two
working days and the following choices do
not apply to me
The number of hours per week I worked on
duty were:
40 or less hours
41 to 45 hours
46 to 50 hours
51 to 55 hours
56 to 60 hours
61 to 65 hours
66 to 70 hours
71 to 75 hours
Over 75 hours
21, Mark an nXn in the space that represents your total
active federal commissioned service completed as of
15 Vay 1962:
1 (44) I am a warrant officer with no active Federal
commissioned service, so this question does
not epply to me



















































































Ansvfer only that prrt of the following question which
applies to you according to the last digit in your
s ervi c e numb e r
Only personnel with Service dumber ending In or 1 answer
22A.
22A»Assurn.e thft a general Increase in pay and allowances
could be marie, for all pay grades; would you stay in
the Navy or consider it an incentive for others to
stay in the Rtn If the increeae were per nonth




Only personnel with Service Number ending in 2 or 3 enawer
22B.
"""
22B. Aasume that a general increase in pay and allowances
could be made, for all pay grades; would you stay in
the Navy or consider it en incentive for others to
stay in the Nevy if the increase were flOO per month




Only "fr^onnel wltla r ervice r ending; tn 4 or 5 answer
22C.
tftC«Aaeuae that 8 general ^.cressf in pay and allowances
cor.ld be made i for fell rr-y erfedeaj I you stay in
the Ravy or consider it en incentive for others to
itay in the Navy if the increase were *?00 per month
for your present r>ry grfede?
1 (489) Yes
2 (?9) 1
Only personnel with °ervice Number ending in 6 or 7 answer
22D.
82D«Aea\uae that a general lncreaae in pay end allowanoaa
could be made, for all pay grades; would you stay in
the Navy or consider it an incentive for others to
stay in the Navy if the increase were $900 per month
for your present nay grade?
1 (442) Yes
2 '58) !
Only personnel with Service IFuatber ending in 8 or 9 answer
22F.
22E'« Assume that a general increase in pay and allowances
could be made, for fell pay rrades, for what increase
in dollars per month for your present pay grade, would
you stay in the >Tavy or eonaider ' 4 n Incentive for
oth -rs to rt ay In the Navy?
1 (79) |60 per month
2 (210) $100 ner month
3 (108) $200 per month
4 (49) |S00 par month





23A.¥hpi If jour designator?
For the purpose of Lhis study the response to this
question was broken down,
| 1 (15TP) S40* 161* 761* 764* 766*
2 (IS?) 110*





Fl (310) 131* 138*
7 (-39) All other groups
*0 for Tlwgulars
5 for Reserves
7 for Tars, etc.
24. What Is your oresent rank?
1 (388) Snsign
2 { 572 ) Lt JG
3 554 ht
4 (430) Lt CDR
5 (294 ) f
6 (95) CPT
25. fth^t are your plans for your Navy Career?
1 ( 1613) I orefer to remain on active duty indefinitely
or until retirement
2 (423) I prefer to remain on active duty only until
I complete my present commitment




26. When you first entered the Ke.vy what were your Navy
career plena?
1 ( 802 Intended to make the Kavy my career
2 (117) Intended to stay in the Navy a while longer
than my obligated tour
3 (582) Intended bo serve a minimum tour (or wartime
duration plus 6 months)
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4 (91) Hadn't thought about It
5 (842) * W«a undecided and waited to see how well I
would like the Navy
27. Are you presently enrolled in an off-duty education
program leading to graduate college ^e with an
accredited civilian institutions?
1 (2133) No






!>ss than 15 semester hours
16-29 semester hours
30 - 44 semester hours
45 - 59
PO - 74
(9) 75 - 89 semester hour*





28. How does your immediate family feel about your making
a career in the Navy?
1
2







8 [97) Dislike it very much
' 71. 1 Don't know
29. When was your initial entry on active duty as a com-
missioned officer?














.Jul 4 17 m Jun 48
Jul 48 - Jun 49
Jul 49 - Jun 50
Jul 50 - Jun 51
Jul 51 - Jun 52
Jul 52 - Jim 53









(75) Jul 54 - Jun 55
W) Jul 55 - Jun 56
(108) Jul 56 - Jun 57
(66 Jul 57 - Jun 58
(132) Jul 59 - Jun 59
( 293
)
Jul 59 - Jun 60
(206)
(S9fe i
Jul 60 - Jun 61
t. -r June 1961
30. What is your highest level of ed '.on now? (Count





(22) Less then high school graduate
Z79J High school graduate
Cieo,3
4 ZZL
Less than two years college
Registered Nurse diploma
Two years or more of college, no bachelor
degree
6 1085) College degree (BS, BA or equivalent, except
' LL.B)
Law degree (LL.B)
Postgraduate work beyond bachelor degree
Master's degree
Doctorate degree







51. Through which of the following officer procurement



















Program other than listed above
32. Would en opportunity to obtain a graduate education at
Navy expense cause you to more favorably consider a
regular Navy commission?
Now hold a regular commission
Yes, it certainly would






(216) No, it probably would not
(105) No, It certainly would not



























































54. How many months of active federal military service
do you have in your present grade level ?
Less than 4 months
4 thru 7 months



















127) 48 thru 53
T01TT 54 thru 59
TffST 60 thru 65
,58) 66 thru 71
TEJ 72 thru 77
"WJ 78 thru 83
84 thru 89
90 thru 95
96 or more months


















and no dependent children
and 1 dependent child
and 2 dependent children
and 3 dependent children
and 4 dependent children
and 5 dependent children
and 6 dependent children
and 7 or more dependent children














Three or more dependents
D (30) Not married (widowed, divorced, legally
separated or never married)








A Navy officer or warrant officer
A Navy enlisted man
A member of the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps
A civilian
36, How many dependents do you have? (Include wife,
dependent children, adopted or stepchildren, parents,



















(13) Nine or more
37. How many dependents do you have of the following types?
A. Dependent children












4 mt Pour or more
C. Wife and other dependent adults
(Include any other dependent person related to





4 (4) Four or more
38, How meny years of active federal military service have
you completed? (Include all active enlisted, warrant




























































30 years and over







In attempting to analyze the questionnaire several
basic assumptions were made. One of these Is that the
officer who has not yet decided to become a career offi-
oer can be influenced by money* Until the average naval
officer has about eight years service he has not yet
developed the patriotism, or esprit de corps which will
keephim in the service under adverse financial conditions.
Many persons would be taken back by such a remark
as to a naval officer's interest in money. These same
self-righteous individuals also think it Is improper to
offer ministers money for services, as it Is too materi-
alistic. Every material thing in the world, and especial-
ly the necessities of life, are measured in the common
denominator of the dollar or its equivalent. The officer
who does not consider money, and the necessity for it,
does not acknowledge his responsibilities. Nor, does he
consider the welfare of his dependents.
It is recognized that some people would not accept
a service career under any circumstances, due to family
reasons or almost total Incompatibility with service life.
However, some officers who respond "no" to a service ca-
reer, as well as those who are undecided, attach various
degrees of importance to the disutilities of service life.




Item when responding to a questionnaire. It Is believed
that their decisions are balanced between various posi-
tive and negative factors.
Another assumption Is that after an officer decides
to become a career officer he will as likely as not answer
"no" to a question such as "22A" on the questionnaire.
"Assume that a general increase in pay and allowances
could be made, for all pay grades, would you stay in the
Navy or consider it an incentive for others to stay in
the Navy if the increase were f50 per month for your pres-
ent pay grade?" This author, with no intention of leaving
the Navy, considers a fifty dollar raise no incentive to
remain. And if a fellow officer's (Lieutenant Commander
grade) decision hung on a fifty dollar raise there would
be no advice to stay in coming from this quarter.
It was also assumed that 'where a choice of salary
increase such as question "22?", not all would choose
three hundred dollars. "Assume that a general increase
in pay and allowances could be made, for all pay grades;
for what increase in dollars per month for your present
pay grade, would you stay in the Navy or consider it an
incentive for others to 3tay in the Navy?" The reasoning
hare is that the officers concerned know full well such
an increase for all officers in his pay grade is not
warranted nor is such a pay raise in keeping with the
national economy.
Based on the preceding assumptions, it was decided
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to sort the responses to question w 22" Into twelve decks
as follows:
Deck Response
I Yes to fifty dollars
II No to fifty dollars
III Yes to one hundred dollars
IV No to one hundred dollars
V Yes to two hundred dollars
VI No to two hundred dollars
VII Yes to three hundred dollars
VTTT No to three hundred dollars
IX Chose fifty dollars
X Chose one hundred dollars
XI Chose two hundred dollars
XII Chose three hundred dollars
Then, to conduct the analysis and evaluation in a
certain framework, it was assumed that those officers who
were allowed to consider certain amounts of money would
have different thoughts about a naval career.
The assumption that an officer's values, that Is f
the utility or disutility of pay and allowances change
as salary increases, Is assumed to be valid. For, he
will suffer greater Inconvenience If he cen better pro-
vide for his dependents? witness Maslow's hierarchy of
basic sociological needs.
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise
(New York - London: McGraw-Hill, 1960)
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After the above classification was accomplished,
each deck was further sorted by pay grade and then again,
by the alternative responses to question ten, "Have you
decided to make the Navy your career?" These frequencies
were converted to percentages and are shown, in tabular
form. The "yes" and "no" response to question "22" equals
one hundred per cent for each alternative answer to ques-
tion ten, as outlined below. See Tables 11 thru 19,
It was considered sufficient for this study to
group the results into categories! "A", Careerists)
"B", Non-Careerists j "G n , Undecided Careerists on Pay
and Allowances; "K", Undecided on more time with Depen-
dents; C thru P plus H thru J and L, M, as all otherss,
Undecided on other Reasons; and C thru M, Total Unde-
cided* •
When analysing the tables it must be remembered
that those who answered yes or no to dollars had no al-
ternative as to the amount.
When looking at the responses of the junior offi-
cers, one might wonder about the junior officer who says
n no" to three hundred dollars when given the chance of
four dollar amounts. It must be remembered that there was
Just one way for him to say "no" to a naval career—by




officers who had a choice of yes or no to a dollar
amount, saying no to $300 can be considered a rejection
of a navel career by the non-careerist and wishful think-
ing on the part of the careerists.
In viewing the responses of the Lieutenant Com-
mander through Commander gr&des it becomes evident that
these officers for the most part regard themselves as
careerists. Their w non answer to dollars could be either
that they think the amount is inadequate, or they have
made retirement plans.
^»?teins and Commanders who responded as other-
than-oareeri sts were so few that it is concluded moat
Captains end Commanders had resolved all of the listed









































100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to $100 82 100 96 60 78 100 100
No to £100 18 mm 5 40 22 - •
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to t200 92 100 94 86 100 75 100
No to $200 o mm 6 14 mm 25 -
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to $300 89 89 100 76 100 100 100
No to #300 11 11 - 24 Ml - -
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mo 22 54 18 9 mm 25 20
CholcellOO 35 38 41 23 33 50 28
of |200 20 mm 23 27 • 25 28
#300 23 8 18 41 17 - 24









Yes to £50 62 75 73 40 80 75 71
Ho to |60 38 25 27 60 20 25 29
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yea to $100 86.4 93 96 73.5 100 100 94
No to *100 13,6 7 4 26.5 - - 6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yea to $200 91 94 96 82.5 100 100 93
No to $200 9 6 4 17.5 mm m 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yea to #300 91 100 94 79 100 100 90
No to #300 9 - 6 21 - • 10
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
$50 19 32 22 mm - 14 33
ChoiceflOO 53 47 66 59 75 57 50
of £200 24 21 22 30 25 29 17
6*qq 4 Ml - 11 - m w»




-^.efk intfhtions - un nt ^
% «*V •/ v^ ** ^ VR..pon„e 1. ^^ , ^fi^ y> j?
Percentages
Yea to £50 68 77 61 73 40 33 83
No to $50 32 23 39 27 60 67 17
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yea to &100 93 97 92 50 100 - 92
Ho to |100 f 3 3 50 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 - 100
Yes to $200 39 93 89 56 100 60 93
No to #200 11 2 11 44 40 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to $300 92 95 100 73 100 100 100
No to |300 3 5 - 27
. Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
$50 21 23 24 7 40 20
Choice^lOO 48 56 35 14 20 100 30
of $200 24 18 35 43 20 - 50
$300 7 3 6 36 20 -






TIONS - LIF N.ANT COMMAND^ ^
^ <*# V*« <&* ^
Yes to $50 59.5 61 43 - - mm 60
No to $50 40.5 39 57 m 100 - 40
Total 100 100 100 - 100 t/B 100
Yes to £100 36 90 57 67 100 m 40
Ho to $100 14 10 43 33 • - 60
Total 100 100 100 100 100 - 100
Yes to $200 93 95 75 50 100 100 50
No to |200 7 5 25 50 - • 50
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to "300 94 93 100 100 100 - 100
Ho to $300 6 7 «• - - - m>
Total 100 100 100 100 100 - 100
$50 12 12 17 - • M 25
Choice&lOO 54 55 33 - 1 - 25
of $200 25 24 33 m «• 1 25
$300 9 9 17 (V - - 25
Total 100 100 100 * m • 100
MOTE: (inhere numbers 1 or 2 are shown they are the
actual number of responses. They can not be








Percentages «* 4? ++
Yes to |j 52 51 67 1
No to $50 47 49 33 1
Total 100 100 100 m m
Yes to $100 39 92 1 1
No to tlOO 11 3 2
Total 1.00 100
Yea to £200 92,5 93 67 50 100 - 50
No to #200 7,5 2 33 50 - 50
100 100Total 100 100 100 - 100
Yes to |SO0 91.6 92.
5
100 50 1 1 100
No to |500 8.5 7.5 50 -
Total 100 100 100 100 100
$50 16.5 16
ChoicetlOO 42 41
of £200 27 27
30 15.5 16
Total 100 100
NOTE: "«here numbers 1 or 2 are shown they ere the actual





ckxmm rirn rows - captain. „•;
Pesponse in ^% ^ ^ » ^^^^
Percentages C' ^° ^°
Yes to $50 40 40
STo to 60
Total 100 100 -
Yes to |100 94 93 100 1 100
No to $100 6 7
Total 100 100 100 - 100
Yes to |ftO0 100 100 1 1
No to $900 -
Total 100 100 -
Yes to $300 100 100 100
No to £300 -
Total 100 100 100
|S0 14 15.5
Choice$100 29 23
of $800 43 46
00 14 15.5
Total 100 100
NOTF: Where numbers 1 or 2 are shown they are the actual















Yea to £50 58 65 72 38 75 65 74
No to ibO 42 35 28 62 25 35 26
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Tea to *100 64 94 89 64 93 100 84
No to |100 If € 11 36 7 - 16
Tot el 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yea to |600 91 96 95 32 100 87 97
No to |200 9 4 5 18 - 13 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yea to |800 92 98 100 80 100 100 100
No to (300 8 2 - 20 w» •*» -
Total 100 )0 100 100 100 100 100
$50 15 16 16 12 12.5 14 17
CholcetlOO 49 56 44 39 75 50 34
of $800 19 23 25 12,5 36 29
$300 14 9 12 24 •w 20
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
*










^ ,^ CS>* ^ .**
'* h*>* <£* ,<>*
Yes to #50 72 74 64 33 75
No to £60 28 26 86 67 25
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to HOC 92 94 80 m 30
No to #100 8 6 20 100 20
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to #800 96 97 90 100 75 100
No to #800 4 3 10 25 -
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to #300 96 97 100 75 - 100 100
No to $300 4 8 25 -
Total 100 100 100 100 - 100 100
#50 19 20 22 - 34
ChoiceflOO 43 45 33 25 - 67 16
of f200 29 25 45 75 - 33 50
$300 9 10 - m
Total 100 100 100 100 - 100 100




riONS - ALf, Oi" «^
\* «** ^ ^*f^>
Response in o^ v^ ^ e«> ^ v&* CS>
P.rcent 8Se, ^^ »** «^ ^ ^ *
Yea to (50 62 66 67 65 42 - 72
No to #60 33 34 S3 36 58 100 28
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to #100 60 92 91 70 86 100 91
.00 10 S f 30 14 ft) 9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to '200 91 66 90 65 100 75 87
No to |200 9 4 10 35 - 25 1?
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yes to >"0C 91 96 62 100 100 93
So to #600 s 8 4 38 - •» 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
;:o 21 25 14 9 9 33-•# 14
Choice! 100 43 45 46 30 55 33-.# 36
of #800 26 25 25 35 18 ft 36
#300 10 5 18 26 18 r>3-0* 14




The next step was to take the responses to
question ten and compute them into common-size percen-
tages for each of the twelve decks, f these have
been charted to give e visual display of the results and
their algnifloance.
It was decided to chart only the three officer
grades, Ihsign through Lieutenant, inasmuch as the three
grades, Lieutenant Commander through Captain, are con-
sidered careerists*
B of the basic theories of this thesis is that
as dollers (salaries) go up, more and more of those who
are undecided will become careerists. This slso applies
to some of the individuals who at the present salary
level say "no" to a naval csreer*
An adequate test of this theory can be made by
comparing the retention rates within a year before and
after each pay raise.
It is believed possible that from e given officer
strength it is possible from these charts to determine
what amount of remuneration is required to retain the

















6 f50 100 200 360
Amounts 50 I100 #200 #300
Tot8l Percentages 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$
Careerists 17 12 15 27.5
Non-Careerists 17 28 39 27.5



































-500 <r #»o ioo sao™
Amounts |50 #100 #200 #300
Total Percentages 100# 100$ 100$ 100$
Careerists 8 m - 29
Non-Careerists 54 86 67 71
Total Undecideds 38 14 33 a»
Undecided for Other
Reesons 19 « m
Undecided for Dependents 1
Separation 15





















Amounts |50 #100 $200 #300
Total Percentages 100$ 100$ 100$ 100#
Careerists 53 42 48 51
Non-Careerists 24 28 23 33
Total Undecldeds 22 30 24 16
Undecided for Other
Reasons 14 17 13 9
Undecided for Dependents 1
Separation 3










LIFUTFNANTS JUKI OP GRADE













Amounts Mo $100 |200 $300
Total Percentages 100$ 100# 100# 100#
Careerists 28 23 50 m
Mon-Careerists 59 69 60 90



























































































Undecided for Dependents 1
Separation
Undecided for Dollars
£50 00 $200 #300
100# 10Q# 100$ 100*
49 37 10 63
28 50 60 37
23 13 30 m
5 13 10 m


















500 |50 100 200 300
Amounts 50 fioo $200 $300
Totel Percentages 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$
Careerists 42 44 41 45
Non-Careerl sts 21 21 28 30
Total Undecldeds 37 35 31 25
Undecided for Other
Reasons 25
Undecided for Dependents 1
Separation 10
























300 sf50 100 £00 300
Amounts #50 $100 $200 #300
Total Percentages 100# 100# 100$ 100#
Careerists 31 16 18 13
Non-Careerists 43 62 64 87
Total Undecideds 20 22 18 m
Undecided for Other
Reasons 12
Undecided for Dependents 1
Separation 7





























£50 00 #200 $300
100$ 100$ 100$ 100$
87 94 88 87
• » «• 4
13 6 12 9
11 6 7 8
2 •» 4 1


















MO 6' f50" 100 200 300
Amounts ISO f-ioo ^200 500
Total Percentages 100$ 100$ 100# lOOg
Careerists 90 66 67 67
Non-Caraert sts - 17 •» 33
Total Undecldeds 20 17 33 m
Undecided for Other








ALL 0fm OFFICFRS SURVEYED
WHO ANSWFRED Yl DOLLARS
100$
Csreerists







"300 —$UT' WO —200 300
Amount
8
$50 $100 $200 $300
Total Percentages 100$ 1C 100$ 100$
Careerists 81 75 77 80
Non-Careerists 6 8 8 5
Total Undecideds 13 17 15 15
Undecided for Other
Reasons































































The tables shown by officer types help point
out the cause of the problem laid down in the Department
of the Navy Bureau of Personnel Instruction 1301,31 B,
dated 7 January 1963, that is, there is a shortage of 1100
officers.
While the justification for flight pay has been
well founded and documented, many aviators think of it
as a payment separate and apart from the regular salary,
end for the added risk involved. They, like all Americans,
think it won*t happen to them, and flight pay is consider-
ed a regular part of the salary, for the job.
The appeal of flight pay, with a low attendant risk,
is believed by some to have attracted individuals, with
little interest in flying, into lighter-than-alr follow-
ing World War II; a condition which possibly hastened its
demise as en effective arm of the Navy today.
It can be seen when analyzing the reasons for the
undecldeds among the 1300 officers, dollars are not a
major factor.
For the 1100 officers, dollars have more signifi-
cance than shown by the undecldeds who respond to dollars.
It should be noted that as dollars are increased more
officers would leave the undecided group and declare them-
selves as careerists or non-careerists. The disutility
of separation from dependents and other reasons for re-




Jecting a career begin to disappear when sufficient
dollars are offered.
The "All other Officers" group falls in between
the 1100 and 1300 as tor (1) percentage of non-careerists,
(2) undecided for dollars, (3) undecided for separation
from dependents.
Now as to percentage of non-careerists , there is
little change in the percentage level as dollars increase
until a very high number of dollars is reached. Undecided
for dollars is of less importance here as this group
draws less sea duty on the whole than the 1100 and 1300
officers. Therefore the cost of living expenses is much
less. Hence the standard of living can be maintained on
less money. With less separation from dependents there
is less family objection to a naval career Bl a signific
factor.
The three sets of graphs make a strong bid for
1
sea pay to resolve the 1100 officer shortage.
Supra
. , pp. 119-121.

CHAPTFF XI
RELATIONSHIP OF OAXEKR ATTITmFS BY DOLLAR RFSPONSE
The United States Navy is an organization almost
unique unto Its self. There are no comparable civilian
organizations and in many respects, none of the other
United States military establishments are as different
from each other as they ere from the Navy. An example,
every United States ship at sea can probsbly be as ready
for combat on five minutes notice now, as it would be
six months from now. While each naval officer is an
individual, he lives in Bn environment common to other
naval officers. Therefore, the response of these offi-
cers regardless of their attitudes to the Navy, should
have a certain variable correlation.
Assumed definitions that will be used in this
chapter are:
Careerist - a career naval officer, and/or one
who is pro-Navy oriented, f.nd identi-
fies himself with its policies and
plans.
Non-Careerist - an officer who feels he can make
better use of his skills as a civil-
ian and be more highly paid or one
who would not accept a naval career
for personal reasons that are not
recorded in the questionnaire.




were chosen from the question v/h? ch were believed
highly significant in governing the thinking and/or
actions of naval officers.
These questions as shown below were assigned short
subjective titles which are used as references throughout
the remainder of this paper.
Then the possible responses to the questions were
divided into two separate categories using the following
criteria? !• One answer was the mode to the question;
such as alternative # two of question one. 2. More pro-
Navy such as, one and two of question six. 3. Only two
possible divisions available, such as yes or no. 4. What
was considered to be a natural dividing point, above or










1. Promotion within last
year 2 all others"
2. Age at promotion within
last year 2 all others*
8. Highest exoeoted level
of education 1 all others
4. Highest expected rank 3-9 1. 2
5. Use of skills after leiav-
lng the Navy 2-4 1
6. Use of Navy training and
experience in civilian
life 1, 2 3-6





































































Fxcept blank one omitted
@The division of this question might be argued for
changing nAn to Lcdrs.thru Captains and *B" to Ensign
thru Lts. In this particular case it would have no
effect on the rank relationships. Tables 32, 33, 34
and 35 on pages 128-134. There would be no signifi-
cant change in the scatter diagrams pages 137-144 or
rank correlations pages 128-134.
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The next step was to group certain selected re-
sponses for the purpose of an Item analysis. Those selected
were the responses of yes or no to fifty dollars, and yes
or no to one hundred dollars. It was felt that the one
hundred dollar answers were nearer to the maximum point of
change in the supply curves than were two hundred dollars
•
Yes or no to three hundred dollars was not considered re-
sponsive to the needs of the Navy, in the lower officer
grades. As to those who had e choice between fifty, one
hundred, two hundred, and three hundred dollars, this would
be a study in bias and beyond the scope end purpose of this
thesis*
Responses to each question were grouped and symbols
assigned for identification.
mmmm
Question assigned numberic?! symbol
I-esponse as previously described divided into
"A" or WBW groups
r
These groups divided byi
Yes to Fifty Pollers - symbol I
No to Fifty Dollars - symbol II
Yes to One Hundred Dollars - symbol III
No to One Hundred Dollars - symbol IV
Then two by two contingency tables were made up
and the following formula applied for chi-square test of
hypothesis or significance.
~~ V~ N{JAP-CBt-£N) 2
i+C)
N Total number of responses
A, B, C, D number of responses In each cell. Four sets




POSTTIVF PFS^ IT TNCFF7
CAHFH? VS HOH-CAREEF ORIEKTHD
Level of Question Yes to:
Significance Number £50 V8 flOO
38.38 19 Peek of Civilian Career
Income
7.09 7 LDO Program
3.87 5 Use of skills after
leaving the Navy
3.81 24 Present Fsnk
»
2.13 13 Discounting theory
2.07 8 Job Satisfaction Navy
vs Civilian
1.86 26 Career Plans on enter-
the Navy
1.85 30 Present educational
level
1*53 17 Non-careerists, career-
ists
1.13 9 Post Service Plans
0.79 28 Family Feelings about
Naval career
0.73 18 Two year Post Service
Income
0.52 1 Promotion within last
year
0.57 3 Highest expected level
of education










NOTE! * Above the line very significantly different
*b* Below the line very significantly the same.
15 Satisfaction of depen-
dents with quarters
4 Highest expected rank
32 Graduate education oppor
tunity
23 Regular - reserve
25 Career Plans





The level of slgn3.fi c shows which conditions
are meaningful bo Individuals who ere careerists end
will not consider leaving the service, or are non-career-
ists end will stay in the Navy if given a fifty or one
hundred dollar raise per month.
Those individuals who have career plans, expect
to be promoted, want an opportunity at higher education,
and. their dependents are generally satisfied with their
quarters.
For the present there is not much concern with
civilian career income or how they will use their skills
after leaving the Mavy.
Careerists and non-careerists differ strongly by
rank and on attitudes toward:
1. The income they expect at the peak of their
car<^r«
2. The LDO Program.
S« Tho use of their skills after leaving the Navy,
Careerists and non-careerists v/ho can be bought
for $100 to become careerists, both regular and reservists,
agree on their career plana and further:
1. ;? £tisfaction with their quarters,
?.. The rr.nk they hope someday to attain.




Level of Question No to $50
Significance dumber Vs #100
4.99 8 Job Satisfaction Navy
vs Civilian
4.88 25 Career plans
4.81 17 Non-Careerists, career-
ists
3.87 18 Two year Post Service
Income
3.63 28 Family feelings about
Naval Career
1.70 7 LD0 Program
1.43 23 Regular - Reserve
1.13 5 TTse of skills after
leaving the Navy
1.11 6 Use of Navy training &
experience in civilian
life
0.82 30 Present educational level
0.53 2 Age at promotion within
last year
0.51 3 Highest expected level
of education
0.50 9 Post Service plans
0. 19 Peak civilian career
income
0.38 1 Promotion within last
year
C.IP 4 ghest expected rank
0.15 32 Graduate education oppor-
tuni ty
0.11 15 Satisfaction of depen-
dents with quarters
0.06 24 Present Rank
0.02 26 Career Plens on entering
the Kavy
0.004 13 Discounting theory
NOTE: -K-Above the line very significantly different.




These officers said they either would not con-
sider or recommend a naval career for either a fifty or
on© hundred dollar raise per month. Table 33 can consist
of three different groups of officers: (1) The careerist
who either considers the offered raise an insult, (a Captain
offered fifty dollars), or will stay without the raise*
(2) The young officer who is not pro-Navy minded and thinks
he can do better on the outside. (3) The older officer
who Is becoming dissatisfied with the monetary reward and
Is about ready to resign, (one-third of this group are
Captains, Commanders, and Lieutenant Commanders). This
group has a high level of job satisfaction, and has future
career plans. They expect to be promoted and their fami-
lies like the Navy. However, it will take dollars now to
keep them in this group, for they are highly frustrated
by their economic status.
Careerists and non-careerists, who are disinterest-
ed in the pay increase as a reason to make the Navy a
career, are considerably different from those who were
greatly influenced by the pay increase. These officers
in Table 33 are apparently interested in money for imme-
diate needs and discount the value of future money, the
value of invested money or annuities.

TABLE 34
CAREERISTS RESPONSE TO DOLLARS
Level of Question Yes vs No to Dollar
Significance Number Pay Increases
65.40 4 Highest expected rank
63.40 25 Career plans
62.27 17 Non-careerists, career-
ists
61.79 52 Graduate education
opportunity
61.03 23 Regular - Reserve
53.80 7 LDO Program
52.30 15 Satisfaction of depen-
dents with quarters
48.73 8 Job satisfaction Navy
vs civilian
48.40 28 Family feelings about
Naval career
47.30 5 Use of skills after
leaving the Navy
42.50 24 Present Rsnk
40.60 30 Present educational
level
37.4 18 Two year Post Service
Income
25.78 26 Career Plans on enter-
ing the Navy
11.64 13 Discounting theory
11.10 S Highest expected level
of education
10.70 9 Post Service Plans
5.30 6 Use of Navy Training
and experience in
civilian life
2.50 2 Age at Promotion within
last year
.60 19 Peak civilian career
Income




Table 54 compares the careerists (this chapter's
definition) or pro-Navy minded individual's responses of:
Yes to fifty dollars :No to fifty dollars
Yes to one hundred dollars :No to one hundred dollars
Here the vast majority of items have a very highly
significant difference. This demonstrates how the re-
sponses change between yes and no to fifty dollars, and
yes end no to one hundred dollars.
It is significant to note that the one item with
the least difference is promotion within the last year,
or where there is still a mental adjustment being made to
the income level.
The Group in Table 35 previously defined as the
non-careerist also shows a shift in response as the ratio
changes in:
Yes to fifty dollars :No to fifty dollars
Yes to one hundred dollars :Ko to one hundred dollars
Starting at th© bottom of the table (least difference)
it is interesting to note the sequence of certain select items:
Condition Effect
Peak civilian career income - Expects raore income as
a civilian
Discounting theory - Wants dollars now
Graduate education opportunity - This plus dollars will
retain them
Promotion within last year - Some satisfaction here
Money has a highly utilitarian factor to the man




I0IT-0ARKERI3TS PFSP^TSF TO DOLLAFS
Yes and No to Dollar
Pay Increase
Post Service Plans















Use of Navy training
and experience in
civilian life
19.43 32 Graduate education
opportunity
19.00 23 Regular - Reserve
18.20 17 Non-Careerists
17.86 13 Discounting theory
16.50 2 Age at promotion with-
in last year
14.90 4 Highest expected rank
8.76 19 Peak civilian career
income
3.11 8 Job satisfaction Navy
vs civilian
.82 18 Two year post service
income
•65 30 Present educational
level




























OF CARFF.EISTS AND NOX-CAFEEFiISTS
When trying to understand the different relation-
ships which the various groupings of respondents have
applied to the items of the questionnaire, the follow-
ing thought might help.
Consider asking each of the various individuals
surveyed (or the grouping as they have been selected),
to mix up a rum punch. With no other direct guidance
than this, they would undoubtedly use a variety of in-
gredients and a multitude of blendlngs. However, each
would still produce a rum punch. These concoctions could
then be sorted or grouped by various colors; then, the
total number again groiiped as to fruit or no fruit, then
grouped by taste. When classification had been completed
the punch could then be correlated or related to each
other. This same thought has been applied here to show
the inter-relationship of the various items on the ques-
tionnaire as blended by various groupings of respondents
(see table immediately following).
The rank relationship shows these items with the
most significant difference at the top, reading down.
This is due to the fact that a higher percentage of
those who could say "yes" or "no" to one hundred dollars,
said "yes", than did so in the group which could only









Career vs Non-Career Oriented
Rank Item
Order Number
1 H5 Peak of Civilian Career
Income
2 7 LDO Program
3 5 Use of skills after leav-
ing the Navy
4 24 Present Rank
#
5 13 Discounting theory
6 8 Job Satisfaction Navy vs
Civilian
7 26 Career Plans on entering
the Navy
8 30 Present educational level
9 17 Non-careerists, careerists
10 9 Post Service Plans
11 28 Family Feelings about
Naval career
12 18 Two year Post Service
Income
13 1 Promotion within last year
14 3 Highest expected level of
education
15 6 TTse of Navy training and ex-
«» perience in civilian life
16 15 Satisfaction of dependents
with quarters
17 4 Highest expected rank
18 32 Graduate education opportunity
19 23 Regular - Reserve
20 25 Career Plana
21 2 Age at Promotion within last yr.
NOTE: # Above the line very significantly different.

















































Us© of skills after leav-
ing the Navy
Use of Navy training & ex-
perience in civilian life
Present educational level
Age at promotion within
last year
Highest expected level of
education
Post Service plans
Peak civilian career income

























































Two year Post Service
Income






Use of Navy Training
* fc^ experience in olv.llfe
Age at Promotion within
last year
Peak civilian career Income






























Yes vs No to Dollars
Pay Increases
Post Service Plana









Use of skills after leav-
ing the Navy
LDO Program
Promotion within lest year
Cereer Plens
Use of Navy training and ex-






Age at promotion within
last year
Highest expected rank
Peak civil! ar. career
* income
Job satisfaction I*avy vs
Civilian








Through use of scatter charts a visual display
can show the correlation of items in either • positive
or negative sense • A lin* et e 45° angle through the
interrelated points rises upward and to the right from
the vertical axis and demonstrates a positive correlation,
A line that is downwerd end to the right represents a nega-
tive correlation,
Ey the use of So^rmen's formula for rank correla-
tion a numerical value of not more then a plus or minus
one can be assigned to these seme items.
R rank 1 - * 2p* •
Where D difference between ranks of the corresponding
items*
N number of items.
Intra-grcup relationship of Careerists and Career-
ists if pay is increased with Nin-Cereerists and Career-
ists who said no to dollers:
FIGURE 1.
n













K = 1 7n





Items 2, 19, 22, 23, 27, 32, 33, and 34 do not show
enough of a positive correlation to fall within pattern
shown. If the reader will consider these items in light
of the relative response of "yes" and "no" to fifty and
one hundred dollars as a condition for remaining in the
service it will present a clearer picture as to the
validity of this test.
This must be remembered when considering the
various mores several hundred naval officers would attach
to the items on the questionnaire.
Items which ere related between groups of "career-
ists," or those who would be "careerists", if pay is In-
creased, and "non-careerists:*
1 Promotion within last year
3 Highest expected level of education
4 Highest expected rank
5 Use of skills after leaving the Kavy
6 Use of Navy training and experience in civilian
life
7 LDO Program
8 Job satisfaction Navy vs Civilian
9 Post service plans
15 Satisfaction of dependents with quarters
17 Non-careerists, careerists
28 Family feelings about naval career
30 Present educational level
32 Graduate education opportunity
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Items which are not related between groups of
"Careerists'* of those who would be "Careerists f n If pay
is increased, and "Non-Careerists."
2 Age at promotion within last year
13 Discounting theory
19 Peak of civilian career Income
23 Regular - reserve
24 Present rank
25 Career plans
26 Career plans on entering the Navy
Inffirenna: It would be expected to find a positive corre-
lation among the education levels, Job satisfaction, and
in general, pro-service attitudes, among those who would
consider a service career for a pay increase; and those
who are careerists but might ignore the offered pay in-
crease If it was insufficient.
The non-relation of the discounting theory would
appear to be the non-careerists wanting money now along
with the expectation of higher income outside the Navy,
That money is a utility, but does not motivate
toward a service career (see page 64),
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Intra-group relationship of Careerists who said
Yes and 1(0 to Dollars (Set III) with:






































As demonstrated above, there Is a strong corre-
ction and those individuals who said no to dollars are
in these respects as much career officers, as those who
said yes to dollars*
Careerists group who have both positive and nega-
tive attitudes toward a pay increase related to groups of
careerists and careerists if pay is increased who have
only positive attitude toward a pay increase by the
following factors:
1 Promotion within last year






5 Use of skills after leaving the Navy
6 Use of Navy training and experience in civilian
life
7 WO Program
9 Job satisfaction Navy vs Civilian
9 Post service plans
1? Di s counting theory
18 Two year post service income
24 Present rank
26 Career plans on entering the Navy
28 Family feelings about naval career
SO Present educational level
Careerists groups who have both positive and nega-
tive attitudes with pay increase related with groups of
Non-careerists and those careerists who say "no" to dol-
lars by the following factors:
1 Promotion within last year
2 Age at promotion within last year
3 Highest expected level of education
6 Use of skills after leaving the Navy
6 Use of Navy training and experience in civilian
life
7 LDO Program
8 Job satisfaction Navy vs Civilian
9 Post service plana
17 Non-careerists, careerists




28 Family feelings about nsval career
30 Present educational level
Of the thirteen items In each case, ten of them are similar*
Inference : That almost as many careerists are saying "no n
t
-
. dollars as "yes" to dollars* Inasmuch as the Navy is
vastly below the Civil Service personnel who hsve been
their contemporaries on the pey scale, it would appear
that a fifty or hundred dollar raise is considered in-
sufficient, and is being rejected*
Intra-group relationship of Non-Careerists who
aaid Yes and No to Dollars {Zet IV) with:
Careerists & Careerists if pay
If increased































Officers who have demonstrated other than a pro-
Navy attitude can be seen responding yes to dollars* Some-
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where between fifty and one hundred dollars pay increase
money starts to overcome attitudes that make a naval
career less than totally acceptable without increased pay.
"Non-Careerists" group who have both positive
and negative attitudes toward a pay increase related to
groups of "careerists" and "careerists, if pay is increased,"
who have only positive attitudes toward a pay increase by
the following factors:
1 Promotion within last year
2 Age at promotion within last year
3 Highest expected level of education
6 Use of %vy training and experience in civilian
life
9 Post service plans
15 Satisfaction of dependents with quarters
23 Regular - Reserve
26 Career plana
26 Career plans on entering the Hsvy
28 Family feelings about I naval rrr^rr
32 Graduate education opportune
Non-Careerists group who have both positive and
negative attitudes toward e pay increase related to
groups of careerists and non-careerists who have only
negative attitudes toward a pay increase by the following
factors!
2 Age at promotion within last year
4 Highest expected rank
5 Use of skills after leaving the Nary
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6 Use of N8vy training and experience in civilian
life
7 LDO Program
19 Peak of civilian career Income
23 Regular - Peserve
28 Family feelings about naval career
v^ith the exception o** two control items, the only
other two similar items rre the use of Navy treining as
a civilian and family feelings. The predominant groups
used in these two questions are those who expect high
salaries on the "outside" and whose families are dissatis-
fied with the Navy.
Inference: These officers feel they can do better as
civilians and the present level of Navy pay is becoming
a major disutility to them.






















While It has been demonstrated that there Is a
positive correlation in careerists and non-careerists
when both ere responding yea to dollars, and again when
responding no, there Is only a negative correlation when
they are cony&red with each other* This would appear to
be a natural assumption and lends proof to the validity
of the test.
Careerists group who hsve both positive and nega-
1
t5.ve attitudes toward a pay increase related with the
non-careerists group who have both positive and negative
attitudes toward a pay increase, by the following factors:
3 Highest expected l«vel of educetlon
4 Highest expected rank
5 Use of skills after leaving the Navy
7 LDQ Program
9 Post service plans
15 Satisfaction of dependents with quarters
17 Eon-careerists, careerists
25 Regular - Reserve
24 Present renk
25 Career plans
26 Career plens on entering the Navy
28 Family feelings about a nevsl cnr*Gr
32 Graduate education opportunity
•* These items have a strong negative correlation
between the two groups witb divergent views, with the ex-
tion of two control items. These are issues on which




Inference : The applied here neve shown a high negative
correlation whioh establishes the proof of the test used
in the previous analysis
•
Conclusion; A pay increase of fifty or one hundred
dollars will provide little utility to the average naval
officer to change his sttitudes for or against a service
career.
Because of the shift in the ratio of response of
yes end no to fifty collars and yes and no to one hundred
dollars It Is believed thft If military pay should fall
further behind, it will become a major disutility.

P'-RT TV
KECOIIWfFNDATIONS AND r <SI0NS

RFOOMMFNDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In making a comparison on salaries and wages
between newly hired management trainees and clerical or
industrial workers, It fs recognized that the management
trainee will start at a lower salary than a person he
might supervise, who has longevity on the Job. A look
at civilian wages will show that the wage Inversion will
not remain this way for long.
Congress expects effectiveness and economy of
1
operation from the military. Both of the above require
the beat of management ability. However, while Congress
is willing to pay comparable wages for the operation of
o
the rest of the government," it is not willing to do so
for the military operations.
The exact reasons for this are not clear-cut as
a whole. Some of it results from different reasons coming
from different parts of the country, and when all the rea-
sons are brought together in the halls of Congress, it
brings forth a problem few men see in the same light.
Some of the facets of this problem are:
1. A great many people do not understand the
military and think it i? refuge for the lazy, indolent
and maladjusted.
I || .11 » ——p-« m i •^-mmmmmII I
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—
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. , S| Computing Basic Pay, 1958, p. 5347*
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.




2. others think It La an unnecessary waste of
money end resources.
?., Tome fe^i it is the patriotic duty of military
men to serve,
4. Others say with the hump f excess of senior
officers) problems why pay decent wages when there is an
over supply.
5. Another facet of the problem are the inaccurate
presentations to Congress.
6. Inept people preparing and researching studies
on pay problems.
7. Services cutting each other down and in the
past making nonsensical suggestions.
8. Poor administration of some of the allowances
allowed by Congress.
9. Too much effort to equate the officer and en-
listed structures together.
10. Too much deference to Congressional question-
ing.
11. Poor public information on pay and responsiblli-
tyof service personnel.
12. Poor guidance to service personnel on their
congressional contacts.
Congress should determine if the TTnited States can
afford a defense establishment and if so, vvhat size. If
a defense establishment is warranted, purchase it in a
balanced fashion. For example, in the not too distant
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past Congress voted money for the PS-70 bomber which
the Secretary of Eefei nnecessery. At this
writing they havs cut the I in the 1965
Hi whilf *t the seme time much of the present military
oi equipment is inope.rr.ti~ led a due to laek of
trained personnel.
There is cons 1 dersb"} c question as to who is re-
sponsible for the defense of the tJnited States when the
Department of Defense operates with somewhat less than
the use of both hands in running the defense establishment.
It becomes obvious, when studying concession*-'1
action on military pay, thr.t the total dollar amount be-
comes the matter under consideration, not the equitable
pay for individual members of the military establishments*
It is also believed that Congress does not realize the
voting influence of the tary«
On the ssa Ion that the military personnel are
not already second ItltenSj end that the officers*
professional ability has not si i, drastic action is
going to soon be necessary tc 3 an alert, responsive,
dedicated military establishment*
The best solution la for Congress to ^iven compara-
ble pay in relation to other government operations , or to
extend the length of obligated service ^or the draftee,
give him teehnlaal training, and then to legislate effec-
tiveness.
For the services there are several courses of
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action which could help the situation* Some of these
are: (1) Ask for the elimination of the draft; thia
would put the lew of supply end demand ©t work on mili-
tary VI lest (2) Aek for g separate pay bill for
each service at wee done prior to 1899, This would be
a limited application of supply end demand, et least
between services. Individual problems of eeeh service
could get direct ration, >ossibly result in
less total cost for , The Individual bills
for service pay we illep r.mounts and cause less
consternation when they go through the 'dilative pro-
cess. t8) lltery tied into Civil Service pay.
The services would probably have difficulty getting the
inversion between the two pay ftealea straightened out,
however] e bird in tv pth two in the bush*
It has been sa? t the annual cost of retired
pay for the military is whet Is holding back the enact-
t of comparable military pay; also, that it is neces-
sary to separate retired pay from active pay. This might
be true, but this sounds a Tittle skin to putting your
dependent mother out of the car in a storm because you
might not have enough Fas to rer.ch the next town, frhile*
many believe there is lace for sentimentality in a
modern military organisation* in reality, there is*
Sentimentalism is a foundation of patriot esprit de




e words "r- ;&yM should be adopted in
piece of "retired pay" ' bi»ing forth the idea that
the pay is not a pens tired military man
is not • man in selling his services, end Ms travels.
411 this could help : I paying for a
deed-horse which i? attached to retired pay.
Converting dependents' allowance to basic pay
would remove the over-touted tax haven and mako compara-
bility of pay more understandable to the advantage of the
service personnel.
Civil Service has used extra promotions to retain
personnel. Congress believe' , leers aye promoted faster
today than in the pt.st with no consideration to the fact
the pace la faster today. lervices should consider
makIng max iiaura use of promo t L >n s •
The best _cers chers should be used
to make future studies on ingress*
ny of the people heretofore used have been good, but an
awfully lot of the in tei , and had no idea
of what they were do in^.
congreasi.'- to militaj ^es there 13
often e big push for cleaning and painting that the budget
1 not support on a continuing basis; thus false im-
Lon is B (3 to I sent f the services.
Officers s one times worry about what en' : d men will
Bay to congressmen. Instead of worrying, they should
prompt the enlisted man end junior officer to give their
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views on pay, housing, end for that natter, any other
subjeot they have opinions sbout. The end result would
be to the benefit of any organisation with good admlnistra-
n.
Gaining and administering rable pay is juat
as much in thr best lnt< of the country as seoing to
It that a ship 5 b ready for i bat«
Whi • t
,
Dafense | he stated
that no private organization coul -vive with the turn-
over of personrir tary has* Perhaps the
*al Service will not survive in the future*
^rdiner and 1 ttee went to a great deal
of detail to show the i ltery pay. If
the many parents end wives who nave lost sons and husbands
through accidents attributed to a low experience level and
Insufficient training were aware of this, there would be
a national explosion.
The storms of the sea csn be weathered and the
passions of men , s Binds " nored, but a one-sided standard
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1. If you received & temporary promotion on active duty
during the period 16 May 1961 - 15 May 1962, hew much




I am e warrant oil leer so this question does
not apply to ma
I am a commissioned oiricer but did not receive
i temporary promotion on active duty d\iring
this period
Aid r< . 7,r ry promotion on active
duty during 16 May 1961 - 15 May 1962 end I had
completed the following ACTIVE Federal commis-
sioned service at that time:
5
Less than 1 year
1 year but Jess then 2










5 years but leas than 4
4 years but less than 5
5 years but less than 6
6 years but less than 7
7 year* but less than 8
8 years but less than 9
9 years but less then 10
10 years hut less than 11




12 years but less than 13
13 years but less than 14




15 years but less than 16
16 years but less thnn 17
17 years but less than IB
I
N
18 years but less than 19
years but than 80
20 years but less than 21
21 years but less than 22




2. If you are a commissioned officer and received a
temporary promotion on active duty during the period
16 May 1961 - 15 May 1962, what was your age at the
time of your promotion?
1
__
I am a Warrant Officer so this question does
not apply to me
2
__
I am a commissioned officer but did not receive
a temporary promotion on active duty during
this period
I did receive a temporary promotion on active
duty during 16 May 1961 - 15 May 1962 and I
was the following age at that time:
3 22 - 24
4 "25-27
5 28 - 30
6 '31-33
7 34 - 36
8 37 - 39
9 40 - 42




C 49 - 51
D 52 - 54
E 55 or older
3. What is the highest level of education which you




1 do not expect to take any more educational
courses or training
I expect at some future date to:
2_ Complete grammar school
3
__. Graduate from high school
4 .._ Graduate from a vocational or trade school
5_ Complete two years of college
6 ._ Graduate from college (AB,BS)
7
___
Graduate from law school (LL .B)
8 Obtain a masters degree (MA, MB, etc.)
9
__
Obtain a doctoral degree (PhD, DSc, DEd, etc.)
A
___
Obtain a degree in medicine (MP)
B
__
Obtain some other graduate degree
C
__
Take courses not leading to a diploma or degree














_„__ Rear Admiral (lower)




9 ' " Admiral
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5. Do you expect to make more or leas use of your
skills and abilities after you leave or retire from













About the same use of my skills end abilities




6. How much do you think your training and experiences
in the Navy will help you in the work you will do in
civilian life?
1 '
' Will probably help a great deal
2
__
Will probably help somewhat
3 Will probably help very little
4
.
Will probably not help at all
5
r
Have no idea how much it will help
6
_____
Don't plan on working in civilian life
7, The Navy has a program which provides for appointing
selected enlisted men in grade E-6 or higher with
over eight years of service to Ensign,
These commissioned individuals can complete their
military careers, up to the total of 30 years of
service, as officers and retire as officer!, up to
the maximum grade of Commander, if they have served
ten or more years in officer status.
Do you believe this program attracts more well quali-
fied enlisted men to stay in the Navy?
1
__
Yes, and is in the best interests of the service
2
__
Yes, but is not in the best interests of the
service
3 No
4 ,____ No opinion
8, If you were soon to leave the Navy, how difficult do
you think it would be to find a Job equal to your










5 * ' Don't know how difficult it would be
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Haven't thought much about It
2
_______
Have thought about it, but have no definite plans
















Skilled craft (carpenter, plumber, etc.)













Professional (doctor, lawyer, etc.)
P
________
Other work than listed above
G
_______
Will probably not work
10. Have you decided to make the Navy your career?
A
_______
I definitely will make the Navy my career*
B
________
I definitely will not make the Navy ray career.
I am undecided but would be more likely to
make the Navy my career if:
(Mark only the one condition which would have
the most Influence on your decision)
C
________
My present billet was changed
D
________
My present station was changed
F
_______
My contribution to national defense was greater
^
_-»-—. ^y promotion opportunity was Improved
G
--------
^y P fiy an<* allowances were sufficient to meet
the demands of a Navy career
H
________
I was sure that the Navy would give me a sepa-




Fringe benefits, such as commissaries, dependent
medical care, etc. were improved
J
_______
I bad a better social opportunity and more per-
sonal freedom in the Navy
K
_______








Changes other than above were made
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B, Which of the above letters (C through L) do you con-
sider the condition which would have the second most
influence on your decision? Write the letter you se-
lect in the space below.
is the second most influential condition.
C. Which cf the above letters (C through L) do you con-
sider the condition which would have the least in-
fluence on your decision? Write the letter you
select in the space below,
is the least influential condition.
11. Have you decided to leave the Navy before retirement?
A
______
I definitely will make the Navy my career, and
stay in the Navy until retirement.
B
________
I definitely will not make the Navy my career,
and will leave the Navy before my retirement
date,
I am undecided but would be more likely to
leeve the Navy before retirement if
J
(Mark only the one condition which would have
the moat influence on your decision)
C
__________
My present billet was changed
D
________
&y present station was changed
E
___________
My promotion opportunities were less
P
_________
My pay and allowances were less than I expect
to get
®
._«_«•• My P8T on retirement was less
H
_________
Fringe benefits, such as, commissaries, and
dependents medical care, etc. were decreased
I
_______
I had less personal freedom and fewer social
opportunities
'
._____•» ^ cannot have ray dependents with me as such
as I have had
^
----------




Changes other than those above were made
B, Which of the above letters (C through K) do you con-
sider the condition which would have the second most
influence on your decision? Write the letter you se-
lect in the space below,
is the second most influential condition.
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Which of the above letters (C through K) do you con-
sider the condition which would have the least in-
fluence on your decision? Write the letter you
select in the space below.
is the least influential condition.
12. If your total compensation (pay, allowances, and
benefits) were increased how would you like to receive
the increase?






In allowances (quarters, subsistence, etc.)




5 ' In a lump sum upon separation or retirement
6
_________
In more retired pey
7
___________
In fringe benefits (dependent medical care,
commissaries, etc.)
8 .-_ ^ n Pay» allowances, and special bonuses
9 ]
'




In pay, allowances, and fringe benefits
B
_____
In pay, allowances, and retired pay
C
________
In some way or combination of ways not listed
above.
13. Assume that there might be an Increase of retirement
compensation. If your compensation upon retirement
from the Navy were increased, what kind of an increase
would you prefer?
If I could choose, I would prefer $in Increase of J
1
________
|100 per month Increase in my pension
2
.
*50 per month increase in my pension and $5,000
in a lump sum payment upon retirement
3
_______
No Increase in pension, and a $10,000 lump sum
payment upon retirement.
14. V^here are your dependents now living?
1
______
I have no dependents, therefore this question
does not apply to me
My dependents (dependent) live:
2
______




With me in quarters owned by me
4
_______
With me in rented quarters
5
______




Away from me In quarters owned by me
7
________
Away from me in rented quarters
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15. Are you and your dependents satisfied with your
present quarters?
Yes







I draw only part of ray allowance
I don't know
17. When do you plan to voluntarily retire from active
military service?








I intend to retire when I have completed
the following number of years of Active
Federal Military Service:
20 or more but less than 22
22 or more but less than 24
24 or more but less than 26
26 or more but less than 20
28 or more but less than 30
30 or more
18. How much do you think your annual income will be two































| 8,000 to 9,999





19. After leaving the Wavy what do you think your annual
income will be at the peak of your civilian career?
(Po not include retired pay)
1
______
1 $o not expect to work
I expect to work and earn:
2 Leaf than $2,000
3 $2,000 to 2,499
4 f2,500 to 2,999
5 ' #3,000 to 8,69*
6 ^3,500 to 3,999
7 $4,000 to 4,499
8 ?4,500 to 4,999











I {15,000 to 24,999
P " i 25, 000 and over
20. Luring the pest four weeks, on the average, how many
hours per week did you spend working on military duties?
1
______
During the pest four weeks I wps absent from
my regular place of duty for more than two
working days snd the following choices do not
epply to me.
The number of hours per week I worked on duty
were:
2 40 or less hours
6 41 to 45 hours
4 46 to 50 hours
5
'
51 to 55 hours
6 56 to 60 hours
7
'
61 to 65 hours
8
"
66 to 70 hours
9 71 to 75 hours
A Over 75 hours
21, Mark an "X* in the space thet represents your total




I am a warrant officer with no active Federal
commissioned service, so this question does
not apply to me





3 1 year but less than 2
A o veers but 1 c •i than 3
5 Z years but less than 4
6 4 years but less than 5
7 i years but 1 & s a than 6
8 6 years but less than 7
9 7 years but less than 8
A
_______
8 years but less than 9
B 9 years but less than 10
C
|
10 years but less then 11
D
_______
11 years but less than 12
E
_______
12 years but less than 15
P
_______
15 years but less than 14
_______
14 years but less than 15
H
_______
15 years but less than 16
1
_______
16 years but less than 17
J 17 years but less than 18
K
_______
18 yeers but less than 19
L
_______
IS years but less than 20
M
_________
20 years but less than 21
V.
_______
21 years but less than 22
_______
22 years but less than 23
P
________
23 yeers or more
Answer only thet part of the following question
which applies to you according to the last digit
in your service number
Only personnel with Service liumber ending in or 1
answer 21A,
22A. Assume that a general increase in pay and allowances
could be made, for ell pay grades, would you stay in
the Navy or consider it an incentive for others to
stay in the Navy if the increase were f 50 per month





Only personnel with Service Number ending in 2 or 3
answer 21 B.
22B. Assume that a general increase in pay and allowances
could be made, for all pay grades; would you stay in
the Navy or consider it an incentive for others to
stay in the Navy if the increase were tlOO per month
for your present pay grade?
1 Yes
2 ' " No
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nly perronnel with Service Number ending in 4 or 5
answer 22C*
22C, Assume that a general Increase In pay and allowances
could be made, fcr all pay «} would you stay in
the Navy or consider it an incentive for others to
stay in the Navy if tht increase were f200 per month
for your present pay grade?
1 Yes
2 No
Only personnel with Service Number ending In 6 or 7
answer 22D.
22P. Assume that a general increase in pay and allowances
could be made, for all pay grades? would you stay in
the Navy or consider it an incentive for others to
stay in the Navy If the increase were $300 per month
for your present pay grade?
1 Yes
2 No
Only personnel with Service Number ending in 8 or 9
answer 22F.
22E. Assume that a general increase in pay and allowances
could be made, for all psy gratfesi for what increase
in dollars per month for your present pay grade, would
you stay In the Navy or consider it an incentive for





. |100 per month
3











23A«Whet is your designator?

















25. What tre your plans for your Navy career?
1
______




I prefer to remain on active duty only until
oonqpleta my present commitment
3
_____
* would prefer to separate immediately
4 * I am undecided








Intended to stay In the Nsvy a while longer
than ray obligated tour
3 Intended to nerve a minimum tour (or wartime
ration plus 6 months)
4
_____
Hadn't thought about it
5
"""
V as undecided and waited to see how well I
^Tould like the Navy
27, Are you presently enrolled in fin off-duty education
program leading to e graduate college degree with an
accredited civilian institution?
1 No
Yes, and have completed:
2
_____
I^ess than 15 semester hours
3
______
16 - T9 semester hours
4
_____
30 - 44 semester hours
5 45 - 59
6 60 - 74
7
""*




9 ' 105 - 119




28, How does your immediate family feel about your making
a career in the TSavy?
1
_____








Dislike it very much
6 ' " Don't know
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29 • Whan was your Initial entry on active duty as a
commissioned officer?
HIever served as a commissioned officer
8 3efo: July 1947 A Jul 54 - Jun 55
8 Jul 47 - Jun 4T E Jttl 55 - Jun 56
4 Jul 48 - Jun 49 C Jul 56 - JUn 57
6 Jul 49 - Jun 50 D Jul 57 - Jun 58
6 il 50 - Jun 51 E
'
Jul 58 - Jun 59
7 Jul 51 - Jun 52 F Jul 59 - Jun 60
8 Jul 52 - Jun 63 G Jul 60 - Jun 61
Jul 53 - -Tim 54 H
'
After June 1961
30. What is your highest level of education now? (Count











Less than high school graduate
[ High school graduate
Less than two years college
mistered Nurse diploma
[ Two years or more of college, no bachelor degree
College degree (ES, BA or equivalent, except LL.B)
1 Law degree (] -
stgraduate work beyond bachelor degree
Master's degree
Doctorate degree
Medical or dental degrees (MP, DPS, Vet'n, etc.)
31. Through which of the following officer procurement
















Program oth«r than listed above
32. Would an opportunity to obta'.n a graduate education
at Navy expense cause you to more favorably consider







Mow hold a regular commission
Yes, it certainly would
Yes, it probably would
ieclded
No, it probably would not
No, it certainly would not
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34, How many months of active federal military service do


















i.ess than 4 months
4 thru 7 months







































96 or more months











Wife and no dependent children
Wife and 1 dependent child
fe and 2 dependent children
Wife and 3 dependent children
Wife and 4 dependent children
Wife and 5 dependent children
Wife and 6 dependent children
Wife and 7 or more dependent children
Not married
,










Three or more dependents
Not married (widowed, divorced, legally separated
or never married)




A Navy officer or warrant officer
A Navy enlisted man
I member of the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps
A civilian
36, How many dependents do you have? (Include wife,
dependent children, adopted or stepchildren, parents,











9 ^Ine or more
37. How many dependents do you have of the following types?
A. Dependent children














8 3ht or more
B. Dependent parents





4 Pour or more
0. Wife and other dependent adults
(Include any other dependent person related to





4 Pour :r more
38. How many yeai's of active federal military service
have you completed? (Include all active enlisted,
warrant and commissioned service on all tours.)
1 Leas than 1 year H 16 years
2 1 year I 17 years
8 2 years J 18 years
4 3 years K 19 years
5 4 years L 20 years
6 5 years M 21 years
7
'
6 years I 22 years
3
'
7 years 1 23 years
years P 24 years
A 9 years Q 25 years
1 10 years 1 26 years
C 11 years s 27 years
D 12 years T 29 years
1 13 years U 29 years
P 14 years V 30 year 3 and over











































































































Lant, PAC, or Conus as Appropriate
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Items above double line - are very significantly different.
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